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THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE 
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION BAN 
Richard Briffault* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Concern about the role of corporate money in democracy has been a 
longstanding theme in American politics.  In the late nineteenth century, 
the states began to adopt laws restricting the use of corporate funds in 
elections.1  The first permanent federal campaign finance law—the 
Tillman Act of 1907—targeted corporations by prohibiting federally-
chartered corporations from making contributions in any election and 
prohibiting all corporations from making contributions in federal 
elections.2  Subsequently amended, continued, and strengthened by the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002, the federal ban on the contribution of corporate 
funds to federal candidates, political parties, and political committees 
that contribute to federal candidates is still on the books.3  Twenty-one 
states also prohibit corporate contributions to candidates in state 
elections.4 
Although the Supreme Court sustained the federal corporate 
contribution ban as recently as 2003 in FEC v. Beaumont, that decision 
and the corporate contribution bans generally today rest on admittedly 
“shaky ground.”5  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit observed, campaign finance law is “in a state of flux (especially 
                                                 
*  Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of Law.  
This piece is a part of the Valparaiso University Law School’s 2014 Symposium.  For more 
pieces from the symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School Symposium:  Money in 
Politics:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015). 
1 The Federal Election Campaign Laws:  A Short History, FEC, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X4VM-VV5U. 
2 Profile:  Tillman Act, HISTORY COMMONS, available at http://www.historycommons. 
org/entity.jsp?entity=tillman_act_1 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZH6U-HW7E. 
3 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012); Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 
29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012); Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2014); Major 
Provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ 
press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6WRR-5PYF. 
4 STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/Limits_to_ 
Candidates_2012-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZCL5-AH2Z. 
5 Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir. 
2012); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164 (2003). 
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with regard to campaign-finance laws regulating corporations).”6  Over 
the past decade, the Roberts Court has demonstrated little respect for 
either legislative campaign finance restrictions or the Court’s own 
campaign finance precedents.7  In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court 
disavowed one of the justifications Beaumont relied on and called into 
question another.8  To be sure, the majority stressed that Citizens United 
concerned only a spending ban—not a contribution restriction—and 
invoked the Court’s campaign finance doctrine that more stringent 
review applies to spending restrictions than to contribution limits.9  But 
Citizens United’s emphatic assertion of the First Amendment rights of 
corporations surely casts a shadow on the constitutionality of corporate 
contribution bans.10  The 2014 decision in McCutcheon v. FEC—which 
subtly ratcheted up the Court’s standard of review of contribution 
restrictions—darkens that shadow still.  Should the Court decide to hear 
a constitutional challenge, the fate of the corporate contribution ban is far 
from clear.11 
Nonetheless, assuming the Court continues to recognize the 
constitutional validity of contribution limits and to apply a less strict 
                                                 
6 Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010). 
7 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (overturning a portion of 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which sustained federal aggregate contribution limits); 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (overturning portions of McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), 
which had sustained prohibitions on corporate campaign spending).  See, e.g., McCutcheon, 
134 S. Ct. at 1462 (invalidating federal aggregate contribution limits); Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828–29 (2011) (invalidating a 
provision of Arizona’s public funding law); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345–46, 367, 372 
(invalidating federal law prohibiting corporate and union independent expenditures and 
electioneering communications); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744 (2008) (invalidating 
federal “Millionaire’s Amendment”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 238, 263 (2006) 
(invalidating Vermont contribution limits).  See also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 482–83 (2007) (sharply restricting scope of the federal ban on corporate and union 
electioneering communications; that ban was subsequently invalidated outright in Citizens 
United). 
8 Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–56 (rejecting “Austin’s antidistortion 
rationale”), with Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 153–54 (citing and quoting Austin).  Compare Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (rejecting shareholder protection rationale for corporate spending 
ban), with Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155–56 (invoking that rationale). 
9 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345, 356–61. 
10 See id. at 342–66 (discussing the First Amendment rights of corporations). 
11 The Court has now twice declined opportunities to address the issue.  See Iowa Right 
to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 134 S. Ct. 1787, 1787 (2014) (denying petition for certiorari to 
the Eighth Circuit decision that, inter alia, upheld Iowa law banning campaign 
contributions by corporations, insurance companies, savings associations, banks, and credit 
unions); Danielczyk v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1459, 1459 (2013) (denying petition for 
certiorari to Fourth Circuit decision upholding constitutionality of federal corporate 
contribution ban). 
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standard of review to contribution restrictions than to expenditure 
limits—admittedly a big “if”—the ban on corporate donations ought to 
pass constitutional muster.12  The corporate contribution ban advances 
two long-recognized public interests that the Court has repeatedly held 
justify contribution restrictions:  (1) the protection of the rights of 
politically dissenting shareholders; and (2) the prevention of the evasion 
of constitutionally valid limits on individual donations to candidates.13  
Although Citizens United dismissed the shareholder-protection concern 
as a support for an expenditure ban, shareholder-protection is an 
important interest previously acknowledged by the Court in the 
contribution restriction context, and a contribution ban is closely drawn 
to protect that interest.14  Shareholder protection should meet the less 
restrictive standard applied to the review of contribution limits.15 
So, too, the Court has long accepted prevention of the circumvention 
of individual-to-candidate contribution limits as a constitutionally 
sufficient justification for other contribution restrictions.16  In Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court recognized that a corporation “is 
simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired 
ends.”17  One of those ends can be making campaign contributions.  In 
most states, a person can form a corporation simply by filing a few 
papers and paying a nominal fee.  A single individual can generate 
multiple corporations that he or she controls and can use to circumvent 
the legal rules governing campaign finance activities.  The use of 
corporations to evade disclosure requirements has become a regular 
occurrence since Citizens United freed corporations to engage in 
independent spending.18  If corporations could also make contributions, 
then use of the corporate form could easily become a means to avoid the 
donation limits on the “people (including shareholders, officers, and 
employees) who are [closely] associated with a corporation in one way 
or another.”19  Although McCutcheon tightened the “fit” required 
between the important public interest a campaign finance law is 
intended to sustain and the restrictions imposed by that law, the 
corporate contribution ban is narrowly tailored, and leaves room for 
other forms of campaign finance activity for the individuals affiliated 
                                                 
12 Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162. 
13 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372. 
14 Id. at 362. 
15 Id. at 370–71. 
16 Id. at 364. 
17 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
18 See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (providing the holding of the Court). 
19 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
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with the corporation.20  Nor do there appear to be less restrictive 
alternatives that can effectively achieve the shareholder-protection and 
anti-circumvention goals. 
In Citizens United, and again in McCutcheon, the Court emphasized 
that the goal of reducing the political power of the wealthy cannot justify 
campaign finance restrictions, and it is surely the case that much of the 
impetus for the corporate contribution ban is public anxiety over 
corporate wealth and power.21  But the shareholder-protection and anti-
circumvention justifications are not based on an effort to curb the role of 
wealth inequalities in politics per se.  Rather, they reflect other key 
features of the corporate form—its artificial existence as a legal entity to 
achieve ends desired by the individuals who have created it, and the 
potential for the interests that control the corporation to exploit 
dissenting shareholders.22  These two interests work in tandem, with 
shareholder-protection having greater purchase for multi-shareholder 
publicly-held entities, and anti-circumvention more relevant for single-
shareholder, closely-held, or nonprofit corporations.  Together, they 
make the case for the corporate contribution ban for reasons other than 
the equality-promoting goal that Citizens United and McCutcheon so 
vehemently rejected. 
This Article explores the current constitutional status of the 
corporate campaign contribution ban.23  Part II provides a brief history of 
corporate campaign finance restrictions, including an analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s case law dealing with the campaign finance rules 
applicable to corporations before Citizens United.  Part III assesses 
                                                 
20 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456–57, 1462 (2014). 
21 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448, 1462. 
22 Citizens United, 558 U.S. 358–59, 361. 
23 This Article does not address laws prohibiting contributions by labor unions, which 
have been a part of the federal campaign finance system since 1943 and are on the books in 
sixteen states.  See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS., supra note 4.  The two justifications this Article 
relies on to sustain the corporate ban—shareholder-protection and anti-circumvention of 
the corruption-preventing limits on individual contributions to candidates—do not apply 
to unions.  As a result of a long string of Supreme Court decisions, dissenting employees 
(the equivalent of dissenting shareholders in the union context) required to pay union fees 
have a right not to have those fees used for political purposes and to have their required fee 
payments reduced accordingly.  By enabling them to opt-out of compelled support for 
political activity, the Supreme Court has already provided objecting employees protection 
from compelled support of political activity.  Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and 
Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 811–19 (2012).  Nor 
are unions, unlike corporations as discussed in Part IV, plausible vehicles for evasion of the 
limits on individual contributions.  See infra Part IV (discussing anti-circumvention).  
Individual union dues or fee payments are generally well below the dollar cap on 
individual donations, and there seems to be little likelihood—or evidence—that a union 
could be created by a wealthy donor solely to end-run the cap on individual donations. 
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Citizens United and its implications for the prohibition on corporate 
campaign contributions.  Part IV evaluates the shareholder-protection 
rationale.  Part V examines the anti-corruption argument in light of 
McCutcheon’s more restrictive analysis of that justification for campaign 
finance regulation.  Part VI concludes. 
II. THE CORPORATE CONTRIBUTION BAN 
A. Origins and Statutory Development 
In his Fifth Annual Message to Congress in 1833, President Andrew 
Jackson hotly denounced the campaign spending of the Second Bank of 
the United States, charging that “this great and powerful institution had 
been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of the 
public officers by means of its money” in 1832.24  In language that would 
fit right into today’s campaign finance debates, Jackson declared “the 
question is distinctly presented whether the people of the United States 
are to govern through representatives chosen by their unbiased suffrages 
or whether the money and power of a great corporation are to be secretly 
exerted to influence their judgment and control their decisions.”25  Three 
decades later, Abraham Lincoln also expressed anxiety about corporate 
corruption of the political process.26 With the Civil War generating 
enormous profits for government contractors, Lincoln wrote: 
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that 
unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of 
my country. . . .  [C]orporations have been enthroned 
and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and 
the money power of the country will endeavor to 
prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the 
people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and 
the Republic is destroyed.27 
                                                 
24 John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Andrew Jackson, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29475 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7EZ8-67S6. 
25 Id. 
26 See Rick Crawford, What Lincoln Foresaw:  Corporations Being “Enthroned” After the Civil 
War and Re-Writing the Laws Defining Their Existence, RATICAL, available at 
http://www.ratical.org/corporations/Lincoln.htmlhttp://www.ratical.org/corporations/
Lincoln.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6PF-X9DD 
(affirming Lincoln’s apprehensions). 
27 Id. 
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Despite these early critical comments, corporations became a central 
focus of campaign finance concern only in the late nineteenth century.  
Civil service reform cut into the ability of candidates and parties to 
finance their campaigns through assessments on government employees, 
while the consolidation of major manufacturers, railroads, banks, and 
mining and oil companies created large and powerful firms with great 
stakes in government tariff, monetary, infrastructure, public lands 
development, and regulatory policies.28  In 1886, former President 
Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican, lamented “[t]his is a government of 
the people, by the people, and for the people no longer. . . .  It is a 
government by the corporations, of the corporations, and for the 
corporations.”29  Two years later President Grover Cleveland, a 
Democrat, pointed to the “existence of trusts, combinations, and 
monopolies” and warned Congress in his Fourth Annual Message that 
“[c]orporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the 
law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s 
masters.”30  As a leading political scientist of the era observed, by 1900, 
in the funding of the political parties “[f]irst and foremost come the 
representatives of the big industrial or financial concerns.”31 
The growing role of corporate campaign money triggered a reaction.  
In 1891, Kentucky amended its constitution to become the first state to 
ban the use of corporate funds to influence any election in the state.32  
That provision is still part of the Kentucky Constitution.33  In 1897, 
following the 1896 election, in which the heavily business-funded 
Republican Party overwhelmed the Democratic and Populist 
presidential candidacy of William Jennings Bryan, three agrarian states 
that had supported Bryan—Tennessee, Florida, and Nebraska—banned 
corporate contributions to candidates and parties.34  Even some 
Republicans from the industrial northeast were troubled by the growing 
role of corporate money in politics.35  At New York’s 1894 state 
                                                 
28 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258 (2003). 
29 See JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL:  THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA 1865–1900, 
xv (Vintage Books 2007). 
30 John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Grover Cleveland, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29529 (last visited Sept. 20, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/F6JQ-B33E. 
31 ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS:  THE MAKING OF FEDERAL 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 165 (1988) (quoting M.I. Ostrogorski) [hereinafter MUTCH, 
CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS]. 
32 Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”:  Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign 
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 883 (2004). 
33 KY. CONST. of 1891, § 150. 
34 Perry Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, 180 NO. AM. REV. 166, 175 (1905). 
35 Id. at 183. 
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constitutional convention, corporate lawyer Elihu Root, subsequently 
William McKinley’s and Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war and 
Roosevelt’s secretary of state, led an unsuccessful effort to insert a 
corporate contribution ban into the state constitution.36  In 1901, William 
E. Chandler, a Republican senator from New Hampshire and a former 
Republican National Committee chairman, introduced the first federal 
bill to keep corporations out of congressional election campaigns.37 
Public attention to corporate campaign money mounted during the 
1904 presidential election.  More than a million dollars—or about $25 
million in 2014 dollars—quietly flowed into Theodore Roosevelt’s 
campaign from J.P. Morgan, Henry Clay Frick, and senior executives at 
Standard Oil, the New York Central Railroad, and major insurance 
companies.38  Following up on earlier, and at that time inaccurate, 
allegations by Joseph Pulitzer in the New York World that the major trusts 
were making large contributions to Roosevelt to head off investigations 
by the recently-created federal Bureau of Corporations, Democratic 
candidate Alton Parker made a major campaign address in which he 
claimed that “debasing and corrupt” payments had been made to the 
GOP by “individuals of corporations . . . who would control the results 
of election contests.”39  His integrity as a trust-buster challenged, 
Roosevelt responded by denying that any business contributions he had 
received involved corrupt dealings and pointed to the “great corporate 
interests” that were financing his opponent.40 
The following year, the New York Legislative Investigating 
Committee (“Armstrong Committee”) revealed in public hearings that 
New York’s three major life insurance companies—the Equitable, New 
York Life, and Mutual Life—had contributed hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to the national Republican Party and Republican officeholders in 
the 1896, 1900, and 1904 elections.41  This “caused a profound sensation 
as it furnished the first tangible evidence of connections between the 
insurance company and a political party,” and was seen as confirming 
the allegations Parker had hurled at Roosevelt the year before.42  In 
                                                 
36 Id. at 168–69. 
37 Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. L. REV. 2, 16 (2008). 
38 EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 356–60 (2001). 
39 Id. at 361. 
40 Id. at 363. 
41 MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS, supra note 31, at 2. 
42 Id. (quoting the Sept. 16, 1905 New York Herald Tribune).  As Mutch explains, the big 
insurance companies loomed much larger in the national economy in 1905 than they do 
today.  In 1903, the three insurers “together took in more money than the entire internal 
revenue receipts of the federal government.”  Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Bellotti:  The 
Corporate Political Contributions Cases, 5 ELEC. L.J. 293, 295 n.5 (2006). 
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response, Roosevelt in his 1905 Annual Message to Congress pointed to 
the “corruption of the flagrant kind which has been exposed,” and urged 
that “[a]ll contributions by corporations to any political committee or for 
any political purpose should be forbidden by law.”43  Senator Benjamin 
R. “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman, a South Carolina Democrat, introduced a bill 
to implement Roosevelt’s proposal as part of a broader, partisan effort to 
investigate corporate contributions in the three prior national elections.44  
The Republican-led Senate quickly passed the bill without debate, 
avoiding the potentially embarrassing investigation Tillman had sought, 
but the measure died in the House.45  Roosevelt repeated his call for a 
corporate contribution ban in his 1906 Annual Message; it was the very 
first item on his agenda.46  When the House reconvened for its short 
lame-duck session in January 1907, it quickly passed Tillman’s bill, 
which prohibited federally-chartered corporations from making 
contributions in any election, and prohibited all corporations from 
making contributions in federal elections.47 
Campaign finance law’s early and intensive focus on corporations 
reflected two concerns.  First, there was a sharp and growing anxiety 
about corporate influence over government.  As Elihu Root argued to the 
1894 New York Constitutional Convention, “great moneyed 
interests . . . are exerting yearly more and more undue influence in 
political affairs.”  A corporate contribution ban would: 
[P]revent the great moneyed corporations of the country 
from furnishing the money with which to elect members 
of the legislature of this state, in order that those 
members . . . may vote to protect the corporations.  It is 
to prevent the great railroad companies, the great 
insurance companies, the great telephone companies, the 
great aggregations of wealth from using corporate 
funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the 
legislature to these halls, in order to vote for their 
                                                 
43 John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Theodore Roosevelt:  Fifth Annual Message, December 5, 
1905, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
?pid=29546 (last visited Sept. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V8NN-SXCQ. 
44 ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE:  A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 48–
50 (2014) [hereinafter MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE]. 
45 See MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS, supra note 31, at 5–7. 
46 See John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Theodore Roosevelt:  Sixth Annual Message, 
December 3, 1906, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/?pid=29547 (last visited Sept. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8VJ8-BAHQ 
[hereinafter Sixth Annual Message] (calling for a ban of corporate campaign contributions). 
47 MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE, supra note 44, at 50. 
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protection and the advancement of their interest as 
against those of the public.48 
As Root explained, corporate campaign contributions put the political 
parties in their debt, “a debt to be recognized and repaid with the votes 
of representatives in the legislature and in Congress or by the action of 
administrative and executive officers who have been elected in a [large] 
measure through the use of the money so contributed.”49  In its report to 
the New York state legislature, the Armstrong Committee made the 
same point: 
The testimony taken by the Committee makes it 
abundantly clear that the large insurance companies 
systematically attempted to control legislation in this 
and other states. . . .  It is apparent that 
contributions . . . for use in State Campaigns were made 
with the idea that they would be protected in matters of 
legislation.  Senator Platt, to whom the contributions 
were made, testified that it was supposed that an 
advantage would be derived through his relation to the 
[Republican] State Committee . . . ; in short, that the use 
of the contributed moneys in the election of candidates 
to office would place them under more or less of an 
implied obligation not to attack the interests supporting 
them.50 
Controlling corporate campaign contributions was part of a broader 
program of addressing corporate power.  Theodore Roosevelt combined 
his call for a ban on corporate campaign contributions with other 
proposals for the “adequate regulation and supervision of the great 
corporations.”51 
Second, there was evidence that corporate executives were misusing 
shareholder funds to advance their own interests—what has come to be 
known as the “other people’s money” problem.  The Armstrong 
Committee found that insurance company contributions were often 
                                                 
48 ELIHU ROOT, THE POLITICAL USES OF MONEY, in E. Root, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT 
AND CITIZENSHIP 143 (collected and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, 1916, 
reprinted 1969). 
49 Id. at 144. 
50 JOHN F. O’BRIEN, TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK TO INVESTIGATE AND EXAMINE INTO THE BUSINESS 
AND AFFAIRS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
2916 (1905). 
51 Sixth Annual Message, supra note 46. 
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inconsistent with the partisan preferences of policyholders, as “executive 
officers have sought to impose their political views upon a constituency 
of divergent convictions.”52  Sometimes the contributions were actually 
used to advance goals adverse to shareholder interests.  The Committee 
noted that the big insurance companies were making large contributions 
at a time when the legislature was considering legislation that would 
affect the ability of policyholders to sue insurance companies for breach 
for fiduciary duty.53  In other words, the leaders of these companies were 
using policyholder funds to secure legislative protection for themselves 
against their own policyholders.54 
Following the Teapot Dome scandal of the early 1920s, the Tillman 
Act was strengthened by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 
which broadened the contribution ban from money donations to include 
“anything of value,” thereby picking up corporate loans, in-kind 
assistance, and the use of corporate facilities.55  In the 1940s, a similar ban 
was imposed on labor union contributions in federal elections, and in the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 the contribution ban was expanded to include a 
prohibition on campaign expenditures by both corporations and 
unions.56  Unions responded to the restrictions on their campaign 
activities with the innovation of the political action committee (“PAC”), a 
formally separate, albeit affiliated, entity with its own officers and funds 
provided by nominally voluntary contributions by union members.57 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) was primarily 
focused on contributions by individuals and on the campaign practices 
of candidates, parties, and political committees, but it also clarified the 
legality of the PAC device and authorized certain corporate and union 
campaign finance activities.58  The 1971 Act, along with amendments in 
1974 and 1976, confirmed that a corporation or union could set up a 
“separate, segregated fund”—that is, a PAC—which could solicit 
donations, subject to monetary limits, from individuals affiliated with 
the corporation or union and use those funds to contribute to, or spend 
                                                 
52 Earl R. Sikes, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-PRACTICES LEGISLATION 109–10 (Duke 
Univ. Press 1928). 
53 Id. 
54 Winkler, supra note 32, at 895–96. 
55 52 U.S.C § 30101(8)(A)(i) (2014). 
56 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012). 
57 The Federal Election Campaign Laws:  A Short History, supra note 1. 
58 Before FECA, President Kennedy’s President’s Commission on Campaign Costs 
recommended many changes to federal campaign finance law, including the abolition of 
the ceilings on individual contributions and on total expenditures by political committees, 
but the Commission also called for the retention and strict enforcement of the prohibitions 
on corporate and union contributions and expenditures.  FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS (1962). 
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money supporting or opposing, federal candidates.59  The Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA” or “McCain-Feingold”) 
subsequently extended the reach of the Taft-Hartley Act’s corporate and 
union expenditure ban and expanded the corporate and union 
contribution prohibition to include all donations to the national political 
parties and all donations to state parties used to finance a defined set of 
federal election activities.60 
B. The Corporate Campaign Finance Restrictions in the Courts 
1. The Early Years 
Early twentieth century courts had little difficulty upholding the 
special restrictions on corporations.  The courts treated corporations as 
artificial creatures with powers limited to the business purposes spelled 
out in their charters, and viewed corporate money as presenting a 
particular danger of “corrupting the elector and debauching the 
election.”61  Before the 1940s, the First Amendment played little role in 
the judicial assessment of campaign finance restrictions.  Even when free 
speech concerns were considered, limits on corporate money were not a 
problem because, in the words of one state supreme court, “[t]he 
individual activities of the officers of corporations are not prohibited.  
                                                 
59 The parent organization could use its own funds—known as “treasury funds”—to 
pay the costs of administering the PAC and of raising funds for it, select the PAC’s 
personnel, and set the PAC’s contribution and expenditure activity.  FECA exempted from 
restriction the expenditure of corporate or union treasury funds on internal 
communications, which are “communications by a corporation to its stockholders and 
executive or administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its 
members and their families on any subject.”  52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(A) (2014).  This 
essentially codified the decision in United States v. CIO.  See 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948) 
(holding that Congress did not intend to prohibit electoral expenditures by a union that 
consisted of communications by the union to its members).  The law further provided that 
“nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its 
stockholders and executive and administrative personnel and their families, or by a labor 
organization aimed at its members and their families,” would not be treated as forbidden 
contributions or expenditures. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(B) (2014). 
60 Major Provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 3. 
61 United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 169 (W.D. Pa. 1916); see, e.g., People v. 
Gansley, 158 N.W. 195, 200 (Mich. 1916) (noting the state may exercise its “police power” 
over corporations with “great freedom for the general good”); People ex rel. Perkins v. 
Moss, 187 N.Y. Crim. R. 383, 387 (1907) (“There are a great many things which those 
intrusted with the management of corporate properties are known to do and which they 
ought not to do, whatever their good motives, not because some statute forbids, but 
because they are not within the scope of the chartered powers.”); McConnell v. 
Combination Mining & Milling, 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904) (noting campaign contributions 
were “clearly outside of the purposes for which the corporation was created”). 
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They may freely speak, write, and publish their views.”62  The few 
constitutional challenges to restrictions on corporate campaign activity 
were rejected.63  A federal district court upheld the Tillman Act barring 
corporate campaign contributions in federal elections in 1916 as a 
measure preventing “undue influence” and “preserving the freedom of 
the voter and the purity of the ballot.”64 
The Supreme Court did not directly address the restrictions on 
corporate campaign activity before Buckley v. Valeo ushered in the 
modern era of campaign finance jurisprudence, but in one important 
pre-Buckley decision dealing with the Taft-Hartley Act’s prohibition of 
union campaign expenditures, the Court demonstrated considerable 
sympathy for the view that corporate financial power poses a threat to 
democratic elections.65  In United States v. Auto Workers, the Court 
considered a challenge to the indictment of a union for spending 
treasury funds on television ads endorsing candidates in a congressional 
election.66  The district court had held that the union’s spending fell 
within an exemption to the Act’s spending ban; the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding the ads fell squarely within the statute.67  That left the 
question of whether the Act was constitutional.  Without resolving  that 
question, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court provided a lengthy, 
sympathetic, and detailed account—dating back to the post-Civil War 
era and quoting from Elihu Root’s address to the 1894 New York 
Constitutional Convention—of public concern about the concentration of 
wealth, the “felt threat to economic freedom created by enormous 
industrial combines,” and the decades-long efforts by state and federal 
governments to control first corporate and then union money in electoral 
politics.68  In his words, these measures were intended to protect “the 
integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the 
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.”69  The 
Taft-Hartley restrictions were the culmination of a “long series of 
congressional efforts calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on 
                                                 
62 Gansley, 158 N.W. at 201. 
63 See id. (rejecting the challenges). 
64 U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. at 168. 
65 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
66 United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am., 352 U.S. 567, 568, 584 (1957). 
67 In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court had held that the spending prohibition did 
not apply to communications by a union to its own members and their families.  United 
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 123–24 (1948).  The district court had held that the Auto 
Workers spending fell within the CIO exemption.  Id. at 108–09. 
68 See Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 570–84 (providing an historical account of the regulation 
of corporate campaign finance activity); id. at 570–71. 
69 Id. at 570. 
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federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise 
control over large aggregations of capital.”70  The law was intended “to 
protect the political process from what it [Congress] deemed to be the 
corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated 
power.”71 
2. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo laid the foundation of modern campaign 
finance jurisprudence by finding that campaign finance restrictions 
implicate the freedoms of speech and association protected by the First 
Amendment.72  The Court applied strict judicial scrutiny to expenditure 
limits, but found that contribution restrictions may be sustained “if the 
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means 
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 
freedoms.”73  It then held that “the prevention of corruption and the 
appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive 
influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on 
their actions if elected to office” are a sufficiently important interest to 
justify contribution limitations.74  Buckley did not address the special 
restrictions on corporate contributions and expenditures, but two years 
later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court decided its first 
corporate campaign finance case.75  Bellotti held that the First 
Amendment applies to restrictions on corporate campaign activity, and 
                                                 
70 Id. at 585. 
71 Id. at 582.  Despite the glowing words, the Court determined that it was premature to 
resolve the constitutional question as the case had not actually been tried.  Id. at 589–92.  On 
remand, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and the case did not return to the 
Supreme Court. Three justices, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, would have invalidated 
the statute under the First Amendment.  Auto Workers, 352 U.S. at 593–98.   
 One pre-Buckley court of appeals case directly addressed and sustained the federal 
prohibition of corporate campaign spending.  See United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 
710, 713–14 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[T]he necessity for destroying the influence over elections 
which corporations exercised through financial contributions.”).  Only one pre-Buckley 
Supreme Court case dealt directly with corporate campaign activity.  In Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 82 (1975), the Court held that Taft-Hartley did not endow shareholders with a 
private right of action to sue their corporation for illegal corporate campaign finance 
activities.  Cort turned on the standards for implying private rights of action and the 
significance of Congress’s creation of the FEC to enforce federal election law rather than the 
constitutionality of the restrictions on corporations.  Id. at 85. 
72 See 424 U.S. 1, 14–18 (1976) (stating that campaign finance regulations are subject to 
review under the First Amendment). 
73 Id. at 25. 
74 Id. at 25, 29. 
75 See 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (reviewing campaign expenditures by banks and 
corporations). 
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it invalidated a provision of the Massachusetts constitution barring a 
corporation from spending concerning a ballot measure that did not 
materially affect its business, property, or assets.76 
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell determined that even though 
a corporation lacks a natural person’s “interest in self-expression,” its 
electioneering is valuable because of the central role election-related 
speech plays in informing “democratic decision-making.”77  Moreover, 
the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing 
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual.”78  Corporate campaign 
speech is constitutionally protected not because of the corporation’s 
interest in being able to speak to advance its self-interest—which was 
taken care of by the exception from the state’s spending ban for ballot 
propositions affecting corporate business, property, or assets—but 
because of the societal interest in voters being able to hear information 
and ideas relevant to the election.  Following Buckley’s determination 
that strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to expenditure restrictions, 
the Court considered the two justifications the state asserted to justify its 
restriction:  (1) “sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of the 
individual citizen in a democracy,” thereby preventing diminution of the 
citizen’s confidence in government; and (2) protecting the rights of 
dissenting shareholders.79 
The Court agreed that the first justification was an interest “of the 
highest importance.”80  The state’s argument that campaign spending by 
“wealthy and powerful corporations” can “drown out other points of 
view” and thereby undermine active citizen participation and public 
confidence in government would be deemed worthy of consideration, 
but only if there were “record or legislative findings that corporate 
advocacy imminently threatened to undermine democratic processes.”81  
The Court found there had been “no showing that the relative voice of 
corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing 
referenda in Massachusetts” or posed any threat to public confidence in 
government.82  More significantly, the majority expressed some doubt 
that such a negative effect of corporate campaign spending could ever be 
shown.83  The Court then reframed the state’s argument into Buckley’s 
                                                 
76 Id. at 802. 
77 Id. at 777 n.12. 
78 Id. at 776–77. 
79 Id. at 788. 
80 Id. at 789. 
81 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. 
82 Id. at 789–90. 
83 Id. 
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concern with the quid pro quo corruption of campaign money on 
officeholders.  It concluded that such a quid pro quo could not arise in a 
ballot proposition election because the spending did not concern a 
candidate who could be “corrupted.”84 
The state’s interest in protecting the interests of dissenting 
shareholders received relatively short shrift.  Shareholder protection was 
deemed to be “an interest that is both legitimate and traditionally within 
the province of state law,” but banning corporate spending in elections 
was held to be both over inclusive and under inclusive.85  It was over 
inclusive because it would apply even if the spending received 
unanimous shareholder approval, and it was under inclusive because it 
targeted corporate campaign spending but not corporate lobbying, and 
only corporations and no other organizations, such as business trusts or 
unions.86 
3. NRWC, MCFL, and Austin 
The four dissenters in Bellotti concluded that the case cast 
“considerable” doubt on all federal and state restrictions on corporate 
campaign finance activity.87  Yet, those restrictions proved surprisingly 
resilient.  Just four years after Bellotti, a unanimous Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, upheld the FECA provision restricting the 
ability of a corporation to solicit contributions for its federal election 
PAC.88  The case involved the National Right to Work Committee 
(“NWRC”) a nonstock, nonprofit, ideological, anti-union corporation.89  
FECA provides that a corporation may solicit contributions for its PAC 
only from executive and administrative personnel and shareholders; a 
nonstock corporation that has no shareholders may solicit its “members” 
but not the general public.90  NRWC did not have formal members but 
claimed that individuals affiliated with the organization by contributing 
to it, so that a contributor became a member for the purpose of future 
solicitations.91  In FEC v. NRWC, the Supreme Court rejected NRWC’s 
statutory interpretation of “member”—thereby constraining the ability of 
the organization to raise campaign funds—and then upheld the 
                                                 
84 Id. at 789–92. 
85 Id. at 792. 
86 Id. at 792–95. 
87 Belloti, 435 U.S. at 802–03 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
88 FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–09 (1982). 
89 Id. at 198. 
90 Id. at 202. 
91 Id. 
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constitutionality of the solicitation restriction.92  The Court found that 
two government interests justified the corporate restriction:  (1) ensuring 
that “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special 
advantages of the corporate form . . . should not be converted into 
political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from 
legislators who are aided by contributions”; and (2) protecting the 
“individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for 
purposes other than the support of candidates from having their money 
used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.”93 
Strikingly, the Court applied the general arguments for special 
restrictions on corporations to an entity totally unlike the paradigmatic 
powerful business corporation that had long been the inspiration for the 
special restrictions on corporations.94  The NRWC PAC had collected just 
$77,000 in the first year it claimed that its donors should be treated as 
members, which was hardly a “substantial aggregation of wealth.”95  As 
a non-stock ideological organization, its putative members were 
voluntary donors who presumably had contributed to the PAC because 
they generally supported the organization’s political views, not for 
unrelated investment purposes.  But instead of closely examining the 
applicability of the general restrictions on corporations to the 
organization at hand, the Court expressed its willingness to honor the 
“legislative judgment” that it was the “special characteristics of the 
corporate structure” not the wealth resulting from the corporate form or 
the use of the corporation as an investment device that “require 
particularly careful regulation.”96  Tracing the development of the 
corporate and union restrictions from the Tillman Act and the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, through Taft-Hartley, FECA and its 
amendments, the Court concluded that this history of “careful legislative 
adjustment of the federal electoral laws . . . to account for the particular 
legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations 
warrants considerable deference.”97  The Court declined to “second-
guess a legislative judgment as to the need for prophylactic measures 
where corruption is the evil feared.”98 
Bellotti and NRWC were technically reconcilable—the latter involved 
contributions and candidate elections while the former dealt with 
                                                 
92 See id. at 206 (analyzing “member”); see also id. at 208 (finding the statutory 
prohibitions and exceptions are sufficiently tailored). 
93 NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208. 
94 Id. at 206. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 209–10. 
97 Id. at 209. 
98 Id. at 210. 
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expenditures and a ballot proposition election—but the tenor and 
reasoning were totally different, with NRWC drawing on the pre-Buckley 
era’s focus on corporate wealth and the misuse of “other people’s 
money.”  Four years later, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
(“MCFL”), the Court avoided choosing between the two approaches.99  
MCFL, a nonprofit, nonstock corporation organized to engage in 
educational and political activities in support of the “right-to-life” cause, 
used its treasury funds to send voters literature presenting the voting 
records of federal and state candidates from a “pro-life” perspective.100  
The FEC contended these campaign expenditures should have been 
funded by MCFL’s PAC, not the corporation’s treasury funds.101  The 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment required the exclusion of 
campaign spending by ideological non-profit corporations like MCFL 
from the general corporate spending ban, but did so in an opinion 
implying that the application of the ban to business corporations would 
be valid.102 
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court found that corporate 
campaign spending poses the danger of “the corrosive influence of 
concentrated corporate wealth” on the “integrity of the marketplace of 
political ideas.”103  Justice Brennan emphasized that corporate resources 
are: 
                                                 
99 479 U.S. 238, 245 (1986).  The Court also addressed the federal ban on corporate 
spending in FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 496 (1985), but the 
corporate status of NCPAC was essentially peripheral to the case.  NCPAC dealt with a 
constitutional challenge to the federal law capping independent spending to aid a 
presidential candidate who had accepted public funding.  Defenders of the law pointed out 
that both NCPAC and another independent spending committee in the case were 
corporations, and argued that NRWC’s justifications for limits on solicitation by corporate 
PACs would also support limits on independent spending by these corporations.  Id.  
However, the NCPAC majority noted that the statute limiting independent spending in 
elections with publicly-funded candidates did not target only corporations but restricted 
spending by any committee, association, or organization whether or not incorporated.  Id.  
Accordingly, the Court did not treat NCPAC as a corporation case.  The Court noted that, 
as in Buckley, it did not reach “the question whether corporations can constitutionally be 
restricted in making independent expenditures to influence elections for public office.”  Id. 
100 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241. 
101 Id. at 238. 
102 Id.  MCFL had also raised a statutory argument that its spending fell within FECA’s 
exemption from the corporate expenditure ban for “any news story, commentary, or 
editorial distributed through the facilities of any . . . newspaper, magazine, or other 
periodical” other than one controlled by a candidate or political party.  Id. at 250 (citing 2 
U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (currently codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (2014))); see also MCFL, 
479 U.S. at 250–51 (rejecting that argument); id. at 249–50 (rejecting MCFL’s constitutional 
claim that its spending did not contain express advocacy). 
103 Id. at 257. 
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[N]ot an indication of popular support for the 
corporation’s political ideas [but instead reflect] nothing 
more than the ‘economically motivated decisions of 
investors and customers. . . .  The availability of these 
resources may make a corporation a formidable political 
presence, even though the power of the corporation may 
be no reflection of the power of its ideas.’”104 
But MCFL’s spending did not raise these concerns.  The organization 
was formed for a political purpose, not an economic one; it did not 
engage in business activities or amass capital in the economic 
marketplace; and the donations it received necessarily reflected the 
donors’ support for its political views.105  It did not accept contributions 
from business corporations, so it could not serve as a conduit for 
proscribed corporate expenditures.106  Moreover, donors had no 
economic stake in the organization which might discourage them from 
disassociating from it if they disagreed with its electioneering.107  
Although corporate in form, MCFL was really a political association and 
not the kind of business that comes to mind when the term 
“corporation” is used.108  As a result, the First Amendment required that 
MCFL and comparable ideological entities be exempted from the 
spending ban.109  But the theory of the MCFL exemption supported 
application of the ban to business corporations that fit the spirit of the 
restriction.110  Four justices, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
dissented, finding the ban should even have been applied to MCFL.111  
They contended that, as in NRWC, the Court should defer to Congress’s 
judgment that spending enabled by the corporate form inherently 
threatens the political process.112  The dissenters also stressed that given 
the availability of the PAC mechanism the law did not really “ban” 
corporate spending as much as it required that spending be channeled 
through a corporate PAC, so the Court need not “consider the validity of 
a direct and absolute limitation on independent expenditures by 
corporations.”113 
                                                 
104 Id. at 258. 
105 Id. at 263–64. 
106 Id. 
107 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 248. 
108 Id. at 263. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 264. 
111 Id. at 266–72. 
112 Id. at 271. 
113 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 271 n.4. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/8
2015] The Uncertain Future 415 
Four years later, in 1990, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce, the Court applied MCFL’s logic and expressly upheld the 
constitutionality of a state prohibition on the spending of corporate 
treasury funds in candidate elections.114  In an opinion by Justice 
Marshall for six justices, the Court agreed with Bellotti that restrictions 
on corporate campaign spending are subject to the First Amendment, but 
found that corporate spending presents distinct dangers that justify its 
prohibition.  Echoing MCFL and NRWC, Austin emphasized the state-
createdness of corporations, the state grant of “special advantages” to 
corporations which give them the opportunity to amass great wealth, 
and the lack of any necessary connection between the resources 
corporations have for electoral activity and public support for their 
political ideas.  Austin couched this in terms of preventing corruption.115  
Buckley had discussed corruption as the quid pro quo between a donor 
and the candidate/elected official-recipient, but Austin held that such 
“‘financial quid pro quo’ corruption” is not the only kind of corruption 
that can justify campaign finance restrictions.116  Michigan’s law 
addressed another type of corruption—“the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”117  That 
“antidistortion” argument sounds a lot like the egalitarian justification 
for limiting spending that Buckley rejected, but Austin insisted that the 
law addressed corruption, not political inequality.118  The problem with 
corporate spending was not that corporations might spend more than 
other political actors, that is, spending inequality, but distortion that a 
corporation’s resources for campaign spending reflects its economic 
success but has “little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”119  Unequal spending was alright if it 
reflected differences in the extent of support for different spenders’ 
political positions, but not when based solely on wealth differences.120  
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion emphasized the dissenting-
                                                 
114 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990). 
115 Id. at 657. 
116 Id. at 668. 
117 Id. at 660. 
118 Indeed, one of Justice Marshall’s law clerks, who clerked for him during the term in 
which Austin was decided, characterized the Austin opinion as “hiding equality behind the 
mask of corruption.”  Elizabeth Garrett, New Voices in Politics:  Justice Marshall’s 
Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 HOWARD L.J. 655, 669–78 (2009). 
119 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
120 Id. at 690. 
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shareholder-protection justification.121  Noting that most members who 
joined the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did so for economic and not 
political reasons, he determined “the State surely has a compelling 
interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting 
those who do not wish to contribute to the Chamber’s political 
message.”122 
Austin not only found anti-distortion to be a compelling justification, 
but determined that the spending restriction was narrowly tailored to 
accomplish that end.123  According to the Court, the restriction was not 
an absolute ban on spending but merely a requirement that the 
corporation use a PAC—which Michigan law, unlike the Massachusetts 
restriction at issue in Bellotti, allowed.124  Moreover, where Bellotti had 
imposed very tight “tailoring” requirements and was quick to fault the 
Massachusetts law for over and under-inclusiveness, Austin was more 
forgiving.125  The law’s application to closely-held corporations without 
great reserves of capital was not a problem.126  As in NRWC, the Court 
emphasized the need to defer to the legislative judgment that it is the 
“potential for distortion” inherent in the capacity of the corporate form 
to facilitate the accumulation of great wealth that justifies regulation.127  
Nor was the law’s exclusion of unincorporated associations and unions 
from the spending ban a constitutional difficulty.128  Unincorporated 
groups might wield power and wealth but they did not benefit from the 
“advantages unique to the corporate form.”129  Union campaign funds 
were a more accurate reflection of employee support for union political 
activities than a corporation’s general treasury funds because the law 
gave employees the right not to have their union dues used for political 
purposes if they objected.130 
Taken together, NRWC, MCFL and Austin strongly validated the 
special restrictions on corporations, notwithstanding Buckley and Bellotti.  
Although the First Amendment applied, the dangers resulting from the 
state-created advantages associated with the corporate form and the 
                                                 
121 Id. at 669–79. 
122 Id. at 675. 
123 Id. at 690. 
124 Id. at 708. 
125 Austin, 494 U.S. at 661. 
126 Id. at 652–53. 
127 Id. at 661. 
128 Id. at 665. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 665–66 (identifying the characteristics of a union campaign fund); see also 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 666–68 (justifying the law’s exemption of news and editorial 
expenditures by the media’s “unique societal role” in promoting public education, 
information, discussion, and debate). 
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interest in protecting minority shareholders provided compelling 
justifications for requiring corporations to channel their contributions 
and spending through PACs.  Bellotti was shunted aside as a ballot 
propositions case of little relevance to candidate elections. 
4. Beaumont and McConnell 
In 2003 in FEC v. Beaumont, the Court rejected an effort to create an 
MCFL-type exemption from the corporate contribution ban for a 
nonprofit corporation, North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. (“NCRL”), and 
strongly affirmed the constitutionality of the corporate contribution 
prohibition.131  Although NCRL’s resources, like MCFL’s, presumably 
reflected the extent of public support for its ideological activities and not 
its success in the economic marketplace—the Court was unwilling to 
disturb “a congressional judgment that has remained essentially 
unchanged throughout a century” that all corporate treasury fund 
contributions should be excluded from federal elections.132  Citing 
NRWC, MCFL, and Austin, Beaumont invoked “the ‘special characteristics 
of the corporate structure’ that threaten the integrity of the political 
process.”133  Beaumont found that “[i]n barring corporate earnings from 
conversion into political ‘war chests,’” the corporate spending ban “was 
and is intended to ‘preven[t] corruption or the appearance of 
corruption”—the government interests that have been the basis for the 
constitutionality of restrictions on contributions since Buckley.134  
Beaumont credited the shareholder-protection rationale—“the ban has 
always done further duty in protecting ‘the individuals who have paid 
money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support 
of candidates from having that money used to support political 
candidates to whom they may be opposed.’”135  Beaumont also gave great 
weight to the value of the corporate contribution ban in preventing 
evasion of the limits on individual contributions: 
Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests 
of contributors and owners, however, another reason for 
regulating corporate electoral involvement has emerged 
with restrictions on individual contributions . . . .  To the 
degree that a corporation could contribute to political 
candidates, the individuals “who created it, who own it, 
                                                 
131 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003). 
132 Id. at 165 n.9. 
133 Id. at 153 (quoting FEC v. NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982)). 
134 Id. at 154 (quoting FEC v. NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)). 
135 Id. (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. at 208). 
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or whom it employs,” . . . could exceed the bounds 
imposed on their own contributions by diverting money 
through the corporation . . . .  [E]xperience 
“demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test 
the limits of the current law, and it shows beyond 
serious doubt how contribution limits would be eroded 
if inducement to circumvent them were enhanced.”136 
Anti-circumvention, thus, joined prevention of corruption and 
appearance of corruption, anti-distortion and dissenting-shareholder-
protection as justifications for the ban on corporate contributions.  The 
anti-circumvention argument was given special prominence in 
Beaumont’s justification of the application of the ban to a nonprofit like 
NCRL.137  As the Court observed, “[n]onprofit advocacy corporations 
are, moreover, no less susceptible than traditional business companies to 
misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution limits imposed on 
individuals.”138 
Beaumont also applied Buckley’s more deferential standard of review 
for contribution restrictions to a law that banned—and did not merely 
impose a dollar limit—on corporate donations.  As the Court explained, 
“[g]oing back to Buckley v. Valeo . . . restrictions on political contributions 
have been treated as merely ‘marginal’ speech restrictions subject to 
relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because 
contributions lie closer to the edges than the core of political 
expression.”139  As a result, whereas expenditure restrictions have to be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, ‘a 
contribution limit involving “significant interference” with associational 
rights’ passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being ‘“closely 
drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’”140  The question for 
the Court was whether the ban was closely drawn to the interests 
supporting the restriction on corporate contribution.141  At that point, the 
Court, as in Austin, rejected the characterization of the prohibition of the 
contribution of treasury funds as a “ban”: 
                                                 
136 Id. at 155 (citing FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446–47, 
456 & n.18 (2010); Austin v. Mich. St. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 664 (1990); 
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)). 
137 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 160 (2003). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 161. 
140 Id. at 162. 
141 Id. 
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NCRL is simply wrong in characterizing § 441b as a 
complete ban. As we have said before, the section 
“permits some participation of unions and corporations 
in the federal electoral process by allowing them to 
establish and pay the administrative expenses of 
[PACs]. . . .  The PAC option allows corporate political 
participation without the temptation to use corporate 
funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with 
the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it 
lets the Government regulate campaign activity through 
registration and disclosure . . . without jeopardizing the 
associational rights of advocacy organizations” 
members.142 
Beaumont noted that “a unanimous Court in National Right to Work did 
not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their 
ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy 
corporation’s sole avenue for making political contributions.”143  
Consequently limiting corporations to making contributions only 
through their PACs did not unduly burden their speech and 
associational rights.144 
A few months after Beaumont, the Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld 
BCRA’s extension of the federal prohibition on the use of corporate and 
union treasury funds for independent expenditures to “electioneering 
communications”—broadcast ads aired during a defined pre-election 
period that refer to a candidate by name but do not use the “magic 
words” of “express advocacy.”145  In so doing the Court recapitulated the 
history of the special limits on corporations and unions—from Elihu 
Root’s 1894 speech and Theodore Roosevelt’s 1905 Annual Message, 
through the Tillman Act, the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Taft-
Hartley, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Auto Workers, and the enactment 
of FECA—and then cited its more recent decisions as support for the 
proposition that Buckley had done nothing to undermine the 
longstanding special treatment of corporations and unions.146  “Since our 
decision in Buckley, Congress’ powers to prohibit corporations and 
unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal 
                                                 
142 Id. at 162–63. 
143 Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163. 
144 Id. at 162–63. 
145 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 168 (2003). 
146 Id. at 115–22.  
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elections has been firmly embedded in our law.”147  The Court reiterated 
its position that the PAC option means it is “‘simply wrong’ to view the 
provision as a ‘complete ban’ on expression rather than a regulation.”148  
The “ability to form and administer” PACs “has provided corporations 
and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in 
express advocacy.”149  Following hard upon the heels of Beaumont, 
McConnell was the post-Buckley Court’s strongest endorsement of 
legislative authority to restrict corporate campaign activity.150  But with a 
five to four division and intense dissents, the ruling was a fragile one.  
Indeed, McConnell quickly proved to be the high water mark for the 
Court’s support for public power to regulate corporate campaign finance 
activity.  Following Justice O’Connor’s retirement and her replacement 
by Justice Alito,151 the doctrinal wheel began to turn, and in 2010 in 
Citizens United the new majority adopted a sharply different approach.152 
III.  CITIZENS UNITED 
A. Corporate Campaign Expenditures 
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court struck down the Taft-
Hartley and BCRA prohibitions on corporate and union independent 
spending.153  In so doing, it overturned the relevant portions of both 
McConnell and Austin, and sharply shifted the Court’s stance on such 
basic issues as whether corporate campaign participation poses a special 
threat to the political process, and the relevance of the PAC option to the 
assessment of restrictions on corporate spending.154  Although the Court 
                                                 
147 Id. at 203. 
148 Id. at 205. 
149 Id. at 203. 
150 Id. 
151 Concurrently with Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist died and was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts.  However, given the similarity 
of Roberts’s views to Rehnquist’s position in McConnell that did not affect the balance of 
votes on the Court.   
152 That shift actually being in 2007, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 
(2007), in which the Court undid much of McConnell’s rejection of the constitutional 
challenge to the portion of BCRA extending the ban on corporate and union expenditures 
to electioneering communication.  Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion determined that the 
First Amendment permitted BCRA’s restrictions only for the narrow set of electioneering 
communication ads that are “the functional equivalent” of express advocacy.  In addition, 
where McConnell has stressed that the BCRA provision was merely a requirement that a 
corporation use its PAC to pay for its electioneering communication and was thus not 
really a spending ban, Chief Justice Roberts insisted that the law was indeed a ban—a 
“censorship” of political speech.  Id. at 482. 
153 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
154 See id. (overruling Austin and McConnell). 
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took pains to emphasize that it was addressing only a law limiting 
expenditures, the case plainly has implications for the special restrictions 
on corporate campaign contributions. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority found that corporate 
campaign expenditures, like other forms of political spending, are 
protected by the First Amendment.  Invoking Bellotti, he emphasized 
that corporations, like individuals, can contribute to political discussion 
and debate.155  He also stressed that the ban on the expenditure of 
corporate treasury funds really is “a ban on corporate speech 
notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still 
speak.”156  Breaking with Austin and McConnell he dismissed the 
relevance of the PAC option because a “PAC is a separate association 
from the corporation” and PACs are subject to “burdensome” 
organizational, reporting, and record-keeping requirements.157  The 
Court then applied strict judicial scrutiny to the corporate spending ban 
and considered three possible justifications for it:  (1) Austin’s 
“distortion” corruption; (2) the protection of dissenting shareholders; 
and (3) prevention of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance.158 
Justice Kennedy flatly rejected the idea that any electoral advantage 
corporations might enjoy from their state-created advantages to amass 
resources in the economic marketplace provides any basis for restricting 
their campaign spending.159  He also dismissed the relevance of the 
concern at the heart of Austin’s antidistortion rationale that corporate 
political “funds ‘may have little or no correlation with the extent of 
public support for a corporation’s political ideas.’”160  Citizens United also 
found the dissenting-shareholder-protection argument could not sustain 
the spending ban.161  Tracking Bellotti, the Court found the ban to be over 
inclusive—it applied to “nonprofit corporations and for-profit 
corporations with only single shareholders” where there could be no 
dissenting votes—and under inclusive, applying only to certain forms of 
corporate election spending and not others.162  Moreover, the Court 
observed “[t]here is little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by 
shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”163  
Finally, although recognizing that prevention of corruption and the 
                                                 
155 Id. at 342–43.  
156 Id. at 337. 
157 Id. at 337–39. 
158 Id. at 348–62. 
159 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–56. 
160 Id. at 351. 
161 Id. at 361-62. 
162 Id. at 362. 
163 Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). 
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appearance of corruption are “sufficiently important” interests to justify 
limits on contributions, the Court emphasized the point it had first made 
in Buckley that those concerns could not support spending limits.164  The 
Court stressed the longstanding doctrinal distinction between 
contributions and expenditures when it dismissed the precedential 
significance of NRWC.  As Justice Kennedy acknowledged, “the Court in 
NRWC did say there is a ‘sufficient’ governmental interest in ‘ensur[ing] 
that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed’ by corporations would 
not ‘be used to incur political debts from legislators who were aided by 
the contributions,” but he went on to explain that “NRWC, however, has 
little relevance here. . . .  NRWC . . . involved contribution limits . . . 
which, unlike limits on independent expenditures, have been an 
accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption.”165 
Citizens United rejected the longstanding anxiety in campaign finance 
law about the power of corporate wealth to distort election outcomes 
and public policy that provided a conceptual foundation for Austin and 
McConnell.  The survival of the corporate spending limits for nearly two 
generations after Buckley is testimony to the continuing power of this 
older idea in our campaign finance thinking.  But Citizens United 
demonstrates that the Roberts Court is more determined than ever to 
limit the scope of campaign finance law and, especially, to reject equality 
as a justification for regulation.  Nonetheless, the Court’s continued 
adherence to the contribution/expenditure distinction and to the 
prevention of corruption and its appearance as justifications for 
campaign finance regulation provide some basis for thinking that the 
ban on corporate contributions may still be constitutional. 
B. Citizens United and the Corporate Contribution Ban 
As the Citizens United Court observed, Citizens United, the plaintiff, 
has “not made direct contributions to candidates” and did not challenge 
the federal corporate contribution ban.166  That constitutional challenge 
has since been mounted but, with the prominent exception of one district 
court decision soon overturned by an appellate panel.167  It has been 
                                                 
164 See id. at 356–61 (discussing government interests that are not important enough to 
support limitations). 
165 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 358 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794); id. at 358–59. 
166 Id. at 359. 
167 United States v. Danielczyk, 788 F. Supp. 2d 472, 494 (E.D. Va. 2011), 791 F. Supp. 2d 
513 (E.D. Va. 2011), rev’d 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012).  It appears that the federal district 
court for the District of New Mexico, in an unreported opinion, also invalidated a corporate 
contribution ban, in this case one adopted by the City of Albuquerque. Giant Cab Co. v. 
Bailey, No. 1:13-cv-00426-MCA-ACT (D.N.M., filed May 6, 2103), discussed in Bob Bauer, 
Breaking Bad in Albuquerque? Or:  the Question of Corporate Contributions After Citizens 
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repeatedly rejected; including by the Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals.168 
In so doing, these courts have relied on two points.  First, Beaumont 
remains the governing precedent.169  Citizens United “did not discuss 
Beaumont and explicitly declined to address the constitutionality of the 
ban on direct contributions.”170  Even if Citizens United’s rejection of the 
anti-distortion and shareholder protection justifications for prohibiting 
corporate treasury fund spending calls into question some of the 
rationales invoked by the Beaumont Court, the rule articulated in Agostini 
v. Felton requires lower courts to follow governing Supreme Court 
precedent:  “[i]f precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, 
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the 
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving 
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”171  Second, 
as several of these courts emphasized, Citizens United not only formally 
left Beaumont undisturbed, it also acknowledged the more deferential 
standard of review traditionally applied to contribution restrictions since 
Buckley v. Valeo, and did nothing to question the anti-corruption and 
anti-circumvention arguments cited by Beaumont as important 
governmental interests justifying the corporate contribution 
prohibition.172  As a result, Beaumont is not only binding precedent but 
also consistent with Citizens United’s analysis.173 
                                                                                                             
United (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/ 
09/breaking-bad-in-albuquerque-or-the-question-of-corporate-contributions-after-citizens-
united/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZNA8-7EE7. 
168 Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 601 (8th Cir. 2013); Minn. 
Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc.  v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 878–79 (8th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 615 (4th Cir. 2012); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 
183–84 (2d Cir. 2012); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010); accord United States v. 
Suarez, 2014 WL 8579, at *1 (N.D. Ohio, May 8, 2014); see also Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. 
Supp. 2d 1023, 1063 (D. Haw. 2012) (relying on appeals court cases sustaining corporate 
donation bans in upholding state law barring contributions to candidates for state office by 
government contractors); Lavin v. Husted, 803 F. Supp. 2d 756, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2011) 
(relying, in part, on Beaumont to reject a challenge to the constitutionality of an Ohio law 
barring candidates for state office from accepting donations from Medicaid providers). 
169 Garfield, 616 F.3d at 199 (finding that Citizens United did not overrule Beaumont). 
170 Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 617. 
171 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quojas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)).  Agostini was cited by the 
Eighth Circuit in Tooker, 717 F.3d at 601 and Swanson, 692 F.3d at 879, and by the Fourth 
Circuit in Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 615. 
172 See Danielczyk, 683 F.3d at 617–19 (noting that Beaumont is still good law, and that 
restrictions on independent expenditures and contributions are subject to different 
standards of judicial scrutiny); see also Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 195 (finding that Citizens United 
confirmed the anti-corruption interest as being a legitimate justification for campaign 
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Nonetheless, Beaumont drew heavily on the older strain in campaign 
finance law, which treated corporations as an especially troublesome 
threat to the “integrity of the political process.”174  As Beaumont put it, 
the “special characteristics of the corporate structure” enable 
corporations to convert their “earnings . . . into political ‘war chests’” 
that pose a special danger of political corruption.175  Citizens United 
completely disavowed this line of thinking.  The state-enabled capital-
amassers of earlier cases are now simply “associations of citizens” 
engaged in constitutionally protected political activity.176  Targeting 
corporations impoverishes the electoral debate by “prevent[ing] their 
voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on 
which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”177  Citizens United 
emphasized that “[t]he First Amendment does not permit Congress to 
make . . . categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the 
speaker.”178  Even if the expenditure ban at issue in Citizens United is 
distinguishable from the contribution prohibition upheld in Beaumont, 
the Roberts Court’s “corporations-are-people-too” approach surely alters 
the doctrinal climate for considering special restrictions on corporations. 
As the Eighth Circuit observed, Beaumont’s precedential value rests 
on “shaky ground.”179  Preserving the corporate contribution ban will 
require a justification other than the concerns about corporate wealth 
and power and the state-created advantages intrinsic to the corporate 
form, which shaped the law in this area from the late nineteenth century 
onward.  Those arguments will focus primarily on Buckley’s principal 
justifications for contribution limitations, the prevention of corruption 
and the appearance of corruption, together with the Court’s repeated 
determination, beginning with Buckley, that some restrictions may also 
be justified as necessary to prevent circumvention or evasion of anti-
corruption measures.180  The interplay of anti-corruption and anti-
circumvention in the aftermath of Citizens United and McCutcheon will be 
                                                                                                             
restrictions); Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1124–25 (finding that nothing in the explicit holdings or 
broad reasoning of Citizen United  invalidated the anti-circumvention interest in the context 
of limitations on contributions); Garfield, 616 F.3d at 200 (finding that an anticorruption 
interest has been recognized as a legitimate reason to restrict campaign contributions). 
173 Accord Allen Dickerson, What Remains of Austin After Citizens United?, 44 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 569, 574 (2013) (“Despite Austin’s fate, Beaumont continues to be good law.”). 
174 See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 125, 153 (2003). 
175 Id. at 146–53. 
176 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 364. 
179 See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 879 n.12 (8th Cir. 
2012). 
180 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 131–32 (1976). 
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addressed in Part V.  But it is also worth considering an argument that 
has been central to the case for limits on corporations since the start of 
the last century and was relied on in Beaumont but dismissed in Citizens 
United—the protection of dissenting shareholders.181  To be sure, one 
appeals court and one commentator have concluded that the 
shareholder-protection interest is no longer available to justify the 
corporate contribution ban, but that over-reads Citizens United.182  
Expenditure limitations are subject to more searching judicial review 
than contribution restrictions.  Moreover, the “procedures of corporate 
democracy” Citizens United invoked are unlikely to adequately protect 
dissenting shareholder interests.183  Shareholder-protection should justify 
the contribution ban, at least as to publicly held multi-shareholder 
corporations. 
IV.  SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 
A. Shareholder Protection as a Sufficiently Important Interest 
The shareholder-protection justification draws on multiple concerns.  
First, corporate executives may use treasury funds to advance their own 
interests, which may be adverse to those of shareholders.  In 1905, the 
Armstrong Committee accused New York mutual life insurance 
companies of using policyholder funds to win legislative support for 
measures limiting the ability of policyholders to sue managers for breach 
of trust.184  More recently, one study that compared states with bans on 
corporate independent spending before Citizens United with states that 
permitted such spending found that states without limits on corporate 
spending were far more likely to adopt corporate anti-takeover laws that 
protected incumbent managers from hostile takeovers and thereby 
decreased incentives for management to run their firms as efficiently as 
                                                 
181 Compare FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154–55 (2003) (finding that shareholder 
protection interest justifies corporate contribution ban), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
361–62 (finding that shareholder protection interest does not support corporate spending 
ban). 
182 See United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding Citizens 
United rejected dissenting-shareholder interest as justification for the ban on independent 
expenditures); Jason S. Campbell, Down the Rabbit Hole with Citizens United: Are Bans on 
Corporate Direct Contributions Still Constitutional?, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 171, 198–99 (2011) 
(contending that Citizens United rejects the shareholder protection interest in all contexts); 
Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 197 (2d Cir. 2012) (determining that it was unnecessary to 
address the question as a corporate contribution ban is justified by the anti-corruption and 
anti-circumvention concerns). 
183 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362. 
184 THE WEEKLY UNDERWRITER, PROVIDENT SAVINGS LIFE REINSURED BY THE POSTAL LIFE 
OF NEW YORK 70 (1911). 
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possible.185  Second, even if corporate spending is not actually opposed 
to the interests of shareholders, it still may not be in the interest of the 
firm.  A growing academic literature has found that, with the exception 
of firms dependent on government contracts or operating in heavily 
regulated industries, corporate political spending does not result in 
greater economic returns for the firm.186  Rather, there is some evidence 
that firms that invest in political activity—again other than firms that are 
government contractors or in heavily regulated fields—actually do 
worse than other firms.187  According to some studies, firms that invest 
in politics do not invest as much in research and development or 
physical capital as other firms and they may be more likely to engage in 
risky strategies.188  These studies suggest that corporate political activity 
is also often associated with higher levels of senior executive 
independence.  In effect, corporate election spending is less an 
investment that increases shareholder wealth and more a “consumption 
good” for senior managers seeking to advance their partisan 
commitments, ideological beliefs, or personal careers.  Providing some 
support for this argument, Harvard Law School Professor John C. Coates 
IV reports that a significant number of the CEOs and senior managers 
whose firms engaged in above-average political activity went on to be 
appointed or nominated to high level public office.189   
                                                 
185 See Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, and 
Agency Costs:  Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 127, 127 (2015) (finding a significant relationship between the presence of a corporate 
independent expenditure ban and a state’s anti-take-over-laws). 
186 See, e.g., Michael Hadani & Douglas Schuler, In Search of El Dorado:  The Elusive 
Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 165, 166 (2013) 
(finding that firms’ political investments are significantly and negatively related to market 
valuation); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After 
Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 664 (2012) (noting corporations engage in 
a mix of shareholder-oriented and nonshareholder-oriented political activity, but the 
predominant or average effect of political activity is negatively related to shareholder 
interests); Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations:  Investment or Agency? 14 
BUS. & POL. 1, 1 (2012) (finding that after controlling for corporate governance, campaign 
donations are associated with lower returns).  But cf. Michael J. Cooper, Huseyn Gulen & 
Alexi Ovtchinnikov, Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns, 65 J. FIN. 687, 687 
(2010) (finding that of firms that have PACs that contributed to federal candidates, those 
that gave to a greater number of candidates holding office in the same state that the firm is 
based in enjoyed above normal increases in value). 
187 See, e.g., Aggarwal et al., supra note 186, at 1; Coates, supra note 186, at 657; Hadani & 
Schuler, supra note 186, at 165. 
188 See Aggarwal et al., supra note 186, at 14 (finding that firms that donate more don’t 
necessarily invest more). 
189 See Coates, supra note 186, at 678–80 (reporting that of retired CEOs, over 11% were 
appointed or nominated to political office between the time of their service as CEOs and 
2011). 
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The controversy following Target Corporation’s 2010 donation of 
$150,000 to Minnesota Forward, a Section 527 committee jointly 
organized by the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce and the Minnesota 
Business Partnership to support pro-business candidates in Minnesota 
state elections, indicates another way corporate spending can hurt a 
company.190  Minnesota Forward used the funds provided by Target, the 
well-known Minnesota-based retailer, and other corporations to pay for 
independent spending in support of the Republican candidate for 
governor, who opposed marriage equality for same-sex couples.191  
Target had made a point of its “gay-friendly” policies, so that when its 
donation became known the firm became the “target” of protests, a 
highly publicized consumer boycott, and a media campaign, including 
hostile YouTube videos by gay rights groups and the politically liberal 
MoveOn.org.192  It is not clear if the boycott affected company sales or 
stock price, but the company’s CEO quickly apologized to its employees, 
saying that although the “intent” of its contribution had been to 
“support economic growth and job creation” it recognized that its action 
had “affected many of you in a way I had not anticipated.”193  Target also 
said it would begin a “strategic review and analysis of our decision-
making process for financial contributions in the public policy arena.”194  
The Target episode and other instances of attempted consumer boycotts 
aimed at companies that donate to controversial causes suggest the 
                                                 
190 Taren Kingser & Patrick Schmidt, Business in the Bulls-Eye? Target Corp. and the Limits 
of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 11 ELECTION L.J. 21, 28 (2011); Brody Mullins & Anne 
Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contributions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696, archived 
at http://perma.cc/2TBN-VPTF; John Gibeaut, A Cautionary Tale of Corporate Political 
Spending Emerges in Minnesota, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/a_cautionary_tale_target_corporate_political_spending_emerges_in_minneso
ta/, archived at http://perma.cc/5QW-F9M6. 
191 Gibeaut, supra note 190. 
192 Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Feels Backlash from Shareholders, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/19/nation/la-na-target-
shareholders-20100820, archived at http://perma.cc/2QQZ-MEYY. 
193 See Kingser & Schmidt, supra note 190, at 29, 32–33.  According to Kingser and 
Schmidt, by August 18, 2010, or roughly three weeks after the bad publicity concerning 
Target’s campaign activity had begun, the company had lost $1.3 billion in stock market 
capitalization.  Id. at 32–33.  Although Target “questioned whether the boycott was the 
cause for the decline in stock price arguing that there were ‘too many factors that we can’t 
attribute it to just one thing.’”  Id. at 30.  In any event, “Target’s stock price [soon] 
rebounded and August sales rose at a comparable rate to the year before.”  Id. at 31. 
194 Martinez & Hamburger, supra note 192. 
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potential for reputational risk and resulting harm to investors when a 
company’s political donations become known.195 
Even if a corporation’s election spending may be in the interest of the 
organization as a whole it may not be in the interest of all shareholders.  
Corporate shareholders are presumably interested in using their 
investment to increase their wealth.  But shareholders—or, at least, the 
individuals among them—are not just investors; they may also be 
parents, employees, retirees, consumers, environmentalists, community 
residents, and citizens with a host of interests and concerns that are 
affected by electoral politics and that in turn affect their individual views 
about elections.  Their interests as parents or consumers or citizens may 
differ from their interests as investors. 
As investors, they might be better off with lower corporate taxes and 
weaker environmental or consumer protection regulations.  But as 
citizens, consumers, or users of public services they may prefer higher 
corporate taxes or more stringent rules.  When it comes time to vote in an 
election, each investor-consumer-parent-citizen has to balance out these 
potentially conflicting preferences and values and make a decision, a 
decision in which the non-investment interests could come out ahead.  
As a shareholder, an individual might be better off if her firm supports 
the anti-tax, anti-regulation candidate, but because of all her other 
interests, that individual might vote for the candidate who favors raising 
taxes to better fund public schools and addressing the emission of 
greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change even if that hurts her 
investment interest.  When corporate managers make campaign 
contributions they do not take the shareholders’ non-investment 
interests into account, nor is it easy to see how they could, given their 
fiduciary duty to the corporation.  In other words, a fundamental 
problem with the use of corporate treasury funds in elections is not the 
misuse of shareholder funds against shareholder economic interests but 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, TAKING INITIATIVE:  HOW 
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO BALLOT MEASURES POSE A RISK TO SHAREHOLDERS, AND 
WHY DIRECTORS MUST OVERSEE COMPANY POLITICAL SPENDING 38–54 (2008) (discussing 
consumer boycotts aimed at companies that donated to controversial ballot proposition 
campaigns); Michael Stocker & Matthew Moehlman, Are Shareholders Happy with Your 
Company’s Political Spending, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2012), available at 
http://knowledgenetwork.labaton.com/upload/2012_415-2.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z8D-ZJKW (finding that corporate political spending may also expose 
companies to profit-impairing reputational risks); Rick Cohen, What to Do About 
‘Reputational Risk’ to Nonprofits from Political Spending, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/20018-what-to-do-about-
reputational-risk-to-nonprofits-from-political-spending.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UJK9-8PSM (indicating that political spending by 501(c)(4) organizations 
might result in a serious reputational risk for all nonprofits). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/8
2015] The Uncertain Future 429 
the overrepresentation of shareholders’ investment interest relative—and 
in opposition to—their other interests. 
In both of the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with restrictions on 
corporate contributions, the Court found that shareholder protection 
justified the federal corporate contribution ban.  In NRWC, a unanimous 
Court noted that one argument put forward for the prohibition of the 
contribution of corporate treasury funds is to “protect the individuals 
who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other 
than the support of candidates from having that money used to support 
political candidates to whom they may be opposed” and it “agree[d] 
with the government” that this was a constitutionally sound 
justification.196  Beaumont quoted the NRWC language and restated the 
point.197 
B. Narrowly Tailored 
Citizens United did not directly address or reject the argument that 
shareholder protection is a compelling interest—the standard in an 
expenditure limit case—let alone a “sufficiently important” interest that 
would justify a contribution restriction.  Instead, the Court concluded 
that the federal corporate spending ban was insufficiently narrowly 
tailored because it was both under inclusive—it applied to “corporate 
speech in only certain media within thirty or sixty days before an 
election”—and “over[ ]inclusive because it covers all corporations, 
including nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations with only 
single shareholders.”198  The federal corporate contribution ban is not 
under inclusive as it applies to all donations to federal candidates, 
national political party committees, and other political committees that 
give to candidates.  The over inclusiveness concern is more apposite. 
Beaumont held that the federal corporate contribution ban applied to 
nonprofit corporations without shareholders, but that was due to the 
ban’s role in advancing the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention 
concerns, not shareholder protection.199  If the only argument for barring 
corporate contributions was shareholder protection, nonprofits and 
single-shareholder corporations would have to be exempted.  However, 
the shareholder-protection argument could justify the ban with respect 
to contributions by multi-shareholder, publicly-traded, for-profit 
corporations.  The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. took a 
similar approach in recognizing the distinction between publicly-traded 
                                                 
196 FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982). 
197 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003). 
198 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010). 
199 Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163. 
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and closely-held corporations and providing only the latter the 
opportunity to assert religious objections to the application of the federal 
mandate that employers provide their employees with health insurance 
coverage for certain contraceptive methods.200  The “corporate giants” 
that Hobby Lobby found would be unlikely to assert a religious objection 
because of the wide range of religious beliefs among their “unrelated 
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of 
stakeholders” are precisely the corporations whose shareholders need 
protection against the misuse of corporate funds for political purposes 
they do not share.201  An MCFL-type exclusion for single shareholder, 
closed corporations and for nonprofits would solve the over 
inclusiveness problem for the shareholder-protection justification. 
Citizens United hinted at an alternative reason the shareholder-
protection interest failed to save the corporate spending ban.  The Court 
contended that shareholder protection could be effectively advanced 
with less burden on First Amendment rights “‘through the procedures of 
corporate democracy.’”202  Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point in 
the Citizens United oral argument when he contended it is 
“extraordinarily paternalistic for the government to take the position that 
shareholders are too stupid to keep track of what their corporations are 
doing and can’t sell their shares” if they object to corporate political 
activity.203  But, in fact, it is extremely difficult for shareholders “to keep 
track of what their corporations are doing,” or to use the “procedures of 
shareholder democracy” to defend their interests.204 
Corporations are under no legal obligation to disclose their election 
spending to shareholders.  To be sure, in recent years, many major 
corporations have agreed to report to their shareholders about their 
political activities, but these reports are often limited to a general 
statement of corporate political spending policies or total amounts of 
spending and do not necessarily include the amounts donated to or 
spent independently for or against particular candidates.205  And the vast 
                                                 
200 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2776 (2014). 
201 Id. at 2774. 
202 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362; see also Campbell, supra note 182, at 198–99 (contending 
that Citizen United rejects shareholder protection interest). 
203 Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-
205). 
204 See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (contending that “procedures of 
shareholder democracy” will protect sharehold interests). 
205 See CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE 2013 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF 
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE 24–34 (Sept. 24, 2013) (studying 
the campaign spending practices of 195 of the top 200 companies in the Standard & Poor’s 
500 index); see id. at 15 (finding only 46% of the companies surveyed “fully answered” for 
which political entities, such as candidates, political parties, 527 groups, 501(c)(4) 
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majority of corporations have no self-imposed reporting policies at all.  
Election laws do generally require the disclosure of contributions and 
expenditures, but these reports are made to public agencies, not to 
shareholders; moreover, it is the recipients of the contributions, not the 
donors, who are required to disclose, again making it difficult for 
shareholders to keep track of what their corporations are up to.206 
Even if a shareholder is informed about a particular corporation’s 
campaign activity, there is little she can do about it.  Voluntary corporate 
disclosures are made in annual reports released long after the election in 
which the contributions were made, and even election law disclosures—
though often reported before Election Day so as to inform the voters—
report contributions only after they have occurred.  At that point the sale 
of shares would be too late from the unhappy shareholder’s perspective 
as the damage is already done.  Further, any post-disclosure sale of 
shares could require the shareholder to take a loss or trigger the 
application of a capital gains tax.  Either consequence would operate as a 
monetary penalty discouraging sale.  And, of course, many people do 
not directly own shares in the corporation that engages in election 
spending, but instead invest through mutual funds or pension plans.  
Disinvesting would require selling the interest in the mutual fund, 
thereby potentially disinvesting from dozens of other companies with 
which the investor has no political quarrel; for many employment-based 
pension plans it may not even be possible for the employee or retiree-
investor to change plans.  As for “object[ing] in the corporate context,” it 
                                                                                                             
organizations or trade associations “they would or would not give money”).  In addition, 
only 37% of the companies surveyed provided “detailed information on the public policy 
priorities” that were the basis of their political decisions; another 22% of the companies 
“provided more vague language on why they give.”  Id. 
206 Lucian Bebchuck & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Million-Comment-Letter Petition:  The 
Rulemaking Petition on Disclosure of Political Spending Attracts More Than 1,000,000 SEC 
Comment Letters, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 4, 2014, 11:00 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/09/04/the-million-comment-letter-petition-
the-rulemaking-petition-on-disclosure-of-political-spending-attracts-more-than-1000000-
sec-comment-letters/#printable, archived at http://perma.cc/QP4Y-SU5Y.  In July 2011, a 
committee of ten corporate and securities law professors filed a petition with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), urging the SEC to develop rules requiring public 
companies to disclose their spending on politics.  Id.  In the following two years, the SEC 
received more than 600,000 comment-letters on the petition—more than on any other 
rulemaking proposal in the Commission’s history.  Id.  The Commission placed the 
rulemaking petition on its regulatory agenda for 2013 but in late 2013, when the 
Commission disclosed its regulatory agenda for 2014 the political spending rulemaking 
petition was not on it.  Id.; Dina ElBoghdady, SEC Drops Disclosure of Political Spending from 
Its Priority List, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/sec-drops-disclosure-of-corporate-political-spending-from-its-priority-list/2013/ 
11/30/f2e92166-5a07-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
S4UX-PEJV. 
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is not clear what that means.  General corporate law principles vest the 
vast majority of corporate policy-making decisions in management.  
Specifically, whether to make campaign contributions at all, and how 
much and to whom to give are entirely up to management.  Shareholders 
have no legal say on these questions. 
A recent Securities & Exchange Commission ruling—which applies 
only to the public companies traded on the exchanges subject to its 
jurisdictions—requires companies to place shareholder-initiated 
resolutions concerning company political spending on the annual 
meeting proxy statements for a shareholder vote.207  But under general 
corporate law principles, such a shareholder resolution must be advisory 
only and cannot bind the company.208  The closest the shareholders get to 
having a voice is when they vote for the members of the board of 
directors; although in only a little more than half of large public 
companies do the boards of directors “regularly oversee” company 
political spending.209  Of course, elections to the board of directors are 
only rarely contested.  Typically, the board itself nominates a slate, 
which it places on the corporation’s proxy card, and the slate runs 
unopposed.  And even if there is an election contest, a shareholder 
discontented with a company’s campaign contributions may still think 
the incumbent board has generally done a good job in running the 
company.  As a result, the exercise of “voice,” like the exercise of “exit” 
through sale, to protest corporate election spending is also 
discouraged.210 
Nor are there less restrictive alternatives to a complete ban that 
would adequately protect dissenting shareholders.  Employees required 
to pay a fee to the union that represents them in collective bargaining are 
entitled to “opt-out” of the union’s political spending to which they 
object by obtaining a dues reduction proportionate to the share of the 
union’s political spending.211  Professor Ben Sachs has proposed that 
                                                 
207 Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Home Depot to NorthStar Asset Management Funded 
Pension Plan, SEC (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M7DY-
ASER. 
208 Shareholder Resolutions, FORUM SUSTAINABLE RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, 
http://www.ussif.org/resolutions (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/BX2B-RTU9. 
209 Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 1 ELECTION L.J. 361, 367 (2002). 
210 See id. at 368 (finding that shareholders are discouraged from selling shares by 
prospect of negative economic effects). 
211 See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1987) (finding that 
Congress did not intend to enable unions to force employees to fund political causes which 
they oppose). 
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shareholders be given a comparable opt-out right which would be 
realized as an annual dividend equal to their pro rata share of the 
company’s political expenditures.212  But as even Professor Sachs 
acknowledges, “such a rule would be difficult to administer,” probably 
fatally so.213  With many investors buying and selling stock on a frequent 
if not daily basis, it will be extremely difficult to determine what any 
stockholder’s pro rata share of corporate assets will be on an annual 
basis.  Many shareholders invest through mutual funds, which also buy 
and sell shares throughout the year, making the shareholder’s stake in 
any one company even more difficult to calculate.214  And as Professor 
Sachs notes, “corporations do not have an obligation to pay dividends to 
shareholders at any set time or based on any particular set of financial 
circumstances” so that a political opt-out right “that took the form of a 
mandatory dividend would be novel in U.S. law.”215 
Other scholars have recognized that “[a]dministering an objection 
system would be complex, particularly for shareholders whose stocks 
are managed by a pension or mutual fund.  Sending out rebate checks as 
dividends . . . would not be a simple task.”216  The differences between 
the very specific annual agency fee assessment imposed on employees 
and the constantly fluctuating investment a shareholder has in a specific 
corporation mean that opt-out is not a feasible or adequate alternative in 
the corporate context.217  
Alternatively, corporate contributions could be conditioned on a 
shareholder vote.  The United Kingdom requires that any company that 
intends to spend more than £5000 on campaign activity must first obtain 
the approval of its shareholders.218  The British law does not require 
                                                 
212 Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-out Rights After Citizens 
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 864 (2012); see Jeremy G. Mallory, Still Other People’s 
Money:  Reconciling Citizens United with Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2010) 
(explaining that dissenting union members are required to step forward, express their 
objection, and claim a pro rata share of the funds used for advocacy). 
213 Sachs, supra note 212, at 864. 
214 See id. at 864 nn.314, 316 (finding that many investors hold their shares through 
mutual funds). 
215 Id. at 864 n.317. 
216 Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Spending and Association Rights After 
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1023, 1088 (2013). 
217 See Sachs, supra note 212, at 858–62 (explaining the difficulty with the opt-out 
proposal).  Indeed, Professor Sachs appears to have proposed the shareholder opt-out 
largely to underscore his view that the employee opt-out is burdensome for unions and to 
make the case for “symmetrical” treatment for corporations and unions.  See id. (arguing 
that imposing an opt-out on unions but not corporations will favor the corporate view 
point). 
218 See MICHAEL SMYTH, PATRICIA BARRATT & FRASER CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF POLITICAL 
DONATIONS 122–24 (2012) (summarizing the British law). 
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shareholder approval of specific donations or expenditures but instead 
provides general authority to use corporate funds for political purposes 
and the total amount that may be spent until either the next annual 
meeting of the shareholders or over the next four years.219  Given that 
any shareholder vote would probably occur at the corporation’s annual 
meeting, which will likely be held at a time unrelated to any elections 
calendar, it seems inevitable that shareholder authorization would 
address only the overall level or, perhaps, type of political expenditure–
contributions, independent expenditures, support for candidates, parties, 
ballot propositions, political committees—but not the identities, or 
amounts spent, with respect to specific beneficiaries or recipients.220  It is 
also unclear what fraction of shareholders would be necessary to 
approve a corporation’s electoral spending.  Only a 100% rule would 
fully protect the interests of all potentially dissenting shareholders, but 
that would be tantamount to a ban.221 
C. Shareholder Protection as Justification for a Contribution Ban 
Citizens United has surely lain to rest for some time to come the 
question of whether shareholder-protection can justify a ban on 
corporate treasury fund spending, but that does not resolve the issue of 
whether that interest can justify a contribution ban.  The Court has 
determined that contribution restrictions are less of a burden on First 
Amendment interests and so are subject to a less rigorous degree of 
scrutiny, merely that they be “‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently 
important interest.’”222  The Court has repeatedly recognized shareholder 
protection as an important interest; Citizens United did not question that 
                                                 
219 Id.; see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Kathy Fogel, Shareholder-Authorized Corporate Political 
Spending in the United Kingdom, 46 U.S.F.L. REV. 525, 526 (2011) (calling for  adoption of the 
British approach). 
220 See Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle:  Seeing and Sanctioning Political 
Spending After Citizens United, 15 J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 462 (2012) (pointing out that 
most  shares of large, publicly traded companies are held by institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds and private pension plans, and most individuals who own stock do so 
through such funds and plans).  As a result, a shareholder approval requirement might 
simply give decision-making authority to a small number of powerful money managers.  
As Taub tartly put it, “[i]f the procedures of corporate democracy are lacking, the 
procedures of mutual fund democracy are nearly non-existent.”  Id. at 483. 
221 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First 
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 252–78 (1981) (arguing that it would be constitutional to 
require a 100% shareholder support rule as a precondition for corporate political speech); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:  Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83, 115 (2010) (finding that a rule requiring 100% approval would go too far 
and be too demanding). 
222 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003). 
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and instead focused on the tailoring of the spending ban to the interest 
and the availability of alternative, less burdensome means of vindicating 
that interest.223  However, as McCutcheon observed, in the context of 
contribution restrictions, what is required for a law to be “closely 
drawn” is “a fit that is . . . reasonable; that represents not necessarily the 
single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the 
interest served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the least restrictive 
means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective.”224  The contribution ban is not under inclusive as was the 
expenditure restriction in Citizens United; the over inclusiveness problem 
can be addressed by an MCFL-type exception, and there is no less 
restrictive means of protecting shareholder interests than a complete ban 
on the contribution of corporate treasury funds.  When coupled with the 
mechanism in current law of allowing the corporation to maintain a PAC 
which can make campaign contributions and to use corporate funds to 
solicit voluntary donations to that PAC from shareholders, the burden of 
the ban on the ability of people associated with a corporation to make a 
contribution that reflects the fact of that association is greatly reduced.  
The ban-plus-PAC option may not have been sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to justify a ban on corporate spending, given the extremely high 
value the Court has placed on spending aimed at the general public and 
the strict scrutiny applied to restrictions on such spending.  But given the 
different standard of review for contribution restrictions, shareholder 
protection for the shareholders of multi-shareholder for-profit 
corporations is a sufficiently important interest, and the ban, with PAC 
option, proportionately tailored to protect that interest to justify the ban. 
V.  CORRUPTION AND CIRCUMVENTION 
From Buckley on, the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
contributions may be restricted because of the important governmental 
interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.  As 
the Court explained, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, 
the integrity of our system of representative democracy is 
undermined.”225  And the corruption danger justifying contribution 
limits goes beyond “the giving and taking of bribes,” which are “only the 
most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence 
                                                 
223 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 475–79 (2010) (addressing shareholder 
protection). 
224 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456–57 (2014) (quoting Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. 
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governmental action.”226  Rather, as the Court subsequently observed, 
the anti-corruption concern is “not confined to bribery of public officials, 
but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with 
the wishes of large contributors.”227  Buckley also found:   
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro 
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of 
corruption stemming from . . . opportunities for abuse 
inherent in a regime of large individual financial 
contributions.  . . .  Congress could legitimately conclude 
that the avoidance of the appearance of improper 
influence “is also critical . . . if confidence in the system 
of representative government is not to be eroded to a 
disastrous extent.”228 
Although contribution restrictions burden the freedom of 
association, Buckley found that even a “significant interference” with the 
right of association may be “sustained if the [government] demonstrates 
a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”229  The 
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption were held to 
meet that standard.230 The Court has consistently adhered to this 
position over the last four decades.231  Contribution restrictions have 
occasionally been invalidated when the Court deemed them to be 
unrelated to the prevention of corruption, such as limits on donations to 
ballot measure committees, or limits on the total amount an individual 
can give to all candidates and committees—or when the limits were so 
low as to interfere with the ability of candidates, particularly challengers, 
to compete effectively.232  Citizens United restated the difference in the 
treatment of expenditure and contribution restrictions and Buckley’s 
validation of “limits on direct contributions in order to ensure against 
the reality [and] appearance of corruption.”233  Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion for the Court in McCutcheon noted that the parties and amici had 
                                                 
226 Id. at 28. 
227 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
228 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. 
229 Id. at 25. 
230 Id. at 33. 
231 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93–94 (2003); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 125, 
146 (2003); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 386; FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 
U.S. 197, 208 (1982). 
232 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981); 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014); Randall v.  Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006). 
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spent “significant energy debating whether the line Buckley drew 
between contributions and expenditures should remain the law,” but 
determined there was “no need in this case to revisit Buckley’s distinction 
between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in 
the applicable standards of review.”234  While hardly a ringing 
reaffirmation of the traditional doctrine, the Chief Justice’s opinion 
indicated that the anti-corruption justification Buckley relied on “may 
properly be labeled ‘compelling,’” and so could be a basis for sustaining 
contribution restrictions even if the Court were to impose the strict 
scrutiny heretofore reserved for expenditure restrictions.235  Of course, 
Buckley and the Court’s other cases relying on the anti-corruption interest 
to sustain restrictions on individual contributions addressed dollar limits 
on donations, not complete bans.  To justify a complete ban on corporate 
treasury fund donations requires turning to the closely related concern 
with preventing evasion of the dollar limits on individual donations—
the anti-circumvention justification invoked by Beaumont when it upheld 
the corporate donation ban—and it involves doing so in light of the 
tighter review of closeness of fit embraced by McCutcheon.236 
A. Anti-Circumvention 
The Supreme Court first recognized an anti-circumvention 
justification for restricting campaign finance activity in Buckley itself.237  
In sustaining FECA’s $25,000 limit on the total contributions an 
individual may give to federal candidates, parties, and political 
committees in a calendar year, in addition to the dollar limit on how 
much an individual may give to any particular candidate, the Court 
found the aggregate limit justified by the concern “to prevent evasion of 
the $1000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise 
contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through 
the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to 
contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s 
political party.”238  It was “thus no more than a corollary of the basic 
individual contribution limitation that we have found to be 
constitutionally valid.”239  Although McCutcheon concluded that due to 
subsequent changes in campaign finance law, FECA’s aggregate limit is 
no longer needed to prevent circumvention of the limits on individual 
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donations to candidates; it did not challenge circumvention-prevention 
as a justification for laws intended to backstop contribution limits.240 
Indeed, the Court has frequently turned to the prevention of the 
evasion of the limits on direct donations to candidates as a justification 
for other contribution restrictions.  In California Medical Association v. 
FEC, the Court sustained FECA’s limit on the amount of money an 
unincorporated association can contribute to its own PAC.241  Although 
there was no danger the association would “corrupt” its PAC, the 
measure was needed “to prevent circumvention” of the individual- and 
association-to-candidate donation limits previously upheld in Buckley.242  
Similarly, in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commission 
(Colorado Republican), the Court upheld the federal statutory limits on 
expenditures by a political party that are coordinated with the party’s 
candidate as a constitutionally valid means “to minimize circumvention 
of contribution limits” on individual donations to candidates.243  The 
majority opinion explained that “all Members of the Court agree that 
circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”244  As previously noted, 
the prevention of circumvention was one of the justifications Beaumont 
gave for upholding the federal corporate contribution ban, even when 
applied to nonprofit corporations.245  And in McConnell v. FEC, the Court 
repeatedly invoked the anti-circumvention justification in support of the 
extension of the ban on soft money contributions to the national political 
parties to the funding of the federal election activities of state political 
parties; to solicitations by national, state, and local political parties of 
donations by tax-exempt organizations; and to the funding of the public 
communications of state and local officeholders concerning federal 
candidates.246 
                                                 
240 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444–47. 
241 Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 200–01 (1981). 
242 Id. at 197–98 (plurality opinion of Marshall, J.); see accord id. at 202–03 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (applying a more “rigorous standard of review” than the plurality but agreeing 
that contributions to a PAC may be limited “as a means of preventing evasion of the 
limitations on contributions to a candidate or his authorized campaign committee upheld 
in Buckley”). 
243 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001). 
244 Id. at 456; see also id. at 456–57 n.18 (referring to “the long-recognized rationale of 
combating circumvention of contribution limits designed to combat the corrupting 
influence of large contributions to candidates from individual and nonparty groups, the 
dissent does not take issue with his justification as a theoretical matter”). 
245 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003). 
246 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003); see id. at 165 (“Having been taught the hard 
lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress 
knew that soft-money donors would react to [the ban on soft money donations to the 
national political parties] by scrambling to find another way to purchase influence.”).  Id. at 
174; see id. at 176 (“Experience under the current law demonstrates that Congress’ concerns 
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Although McCutcheon indicates that the Court will more closely 
probe the fit between the seriousness of a circumvention problem and 
the restriction intended to prevent it, there is nothing in the Court’s 
recent campaign finance jurisprudence that suggests that prevention of 
the circumvention of corruption-preventing and appearance-of-
corruption-preventing contribution limits is no longer a constitutionally 
substantial interest capable of justifying a campaign finance restriction.247  
The possibility that individuals would use the ability of corporations to 
make donations to evade the limits on individual donations is surely 
substantial.  It is extremely easy to create a corporation.  In most states a 
new corporation can be formed simply by filing a few papers and paying 
a nominal fee.  A single individual can generate multiple corporations 
that he or she controls and can use to end-run the cap on donations.  The 
adoption of a dollar limit on the size of an individual’s donations to a 
candidate would be meaningless if the individual could proliferate new 
corporations, each of which could separately donate to the same 
candidate. 
Similarly, enabling corporations to participate in election campaigns 
can lead to the frustration of disclosure requirements, as a donor can 
easily disguise his role in a campaign by creating and putting money in a 
corporation, which contributes to a candidate.  Individuals may be able 
to use their minor children to evade contribution limits but it is far easier 
and quicker to generate multiple corporations, not to mention not having 
to pay for their college educations.  The use of corporations to evade 
disclosure requirements became a regular occurrence after Citizens 
United authorized corporate independent spending.248 
                                                                                                             
about circumvention are not merely hypothetical.”); id. at 184 (citing “Congress’ strong 
interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits”). 
247 In one of his early campaign finance opinions, Chief Justice Roberts signaled his 
skepticism about the anti-circumvention argument when he condemned as “prophylaxis-
upon-prophylaxis” the effort to apply BCRA’s definition of “electioneering 
communications”—an expansion of the definition of corporate and union independent 
expenditures to cope with evasion of the statutory spending ban—to communications not 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.  See FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 
U.S. 449, 479 (2007).  The Chief Justice then quoted his own “prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis” phrase in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014), in rejecting the 
prevention of circumvention of the individual contribution limits justification for the 
aggregate contributions, implying that the contribution limit, in applying to all 
contributions above a threshold amount, is itself a form of prophylaxis that prevents some 
non-corrupt contributions in order to combat the use of contributions for quid pro quo 
corruption. 
248 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (holding that the government cannot 
suppress corporate political speech and that corporations still have rights despite a profit 
or non-profit status). 
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In one notorious incident, an entity known as Specialty Group, Inc., 
which was first incorporated on September 26, 2012, contributed 
$10,575,000 million to FreedomWorks for America, an independent 
expenditure political committee, between October 1 and November 1, 
2012.249  That made Specialty Group, Inc. the fourth largest donor to 
independent spending groups in the 2012 election.250  FreedomWorks 
itself was the sixth largest outside spender in 2012, and Specialty Group 
accounted for more than half of its funds.251  However, according to 
news accounts, “Specialty Group appeared to have no website 
describing its products or services,” gave as its address a Knoxville, 
Tennessee residence, and was not required to make any disclosure 
concerning the source of its funds.252  Similarly, corporations and similar 
artificial entities like limited liability companies (“LLCs”) can go out of 
existence, change names, re-form, or work through subsidiaries or 
affiliates in ways that at the very least hinder the ability of media, voters, 
and campaign finance agencies to track the flow of funds from original 
donor to ultimate campaign recipients.253  In Western Tradition Partnership 
v. Attorney General (WTP) litigation, the post-Citizens United case in 
which Montana unsuccessfully sought to sustain its century-old ban on 
corporate campaign spending in state elections, the Montana Supreme 
Court found that WTP—despite the word “partnership” in its name, the 
entity is a corporation—was created “to act as a conduit of funds for 
persons and entities including corporations who want to spend money 
                                                 
249 Jack Gilliam, Specialty Group Inc., Mystery Firm, Formed Days Before $5 Million Campaign 
Gift, HUFF. POST (Oct. 27, 2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
10/27/specialty-group-inc-donation_n_2031207.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CL9G-
DZYA; Center for Responsive Politics, Specialty Group Inc.:  Donor Detail, OPEN SECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2012&id=Special
ty+Group+Inc&type=O&super=N (last visited Nov. 15, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7DMR-4QYZ. 
250 Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPEN 
SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D 
&type=O (last visited Nov. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F9HY-RW7F. 
251 Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPEN SECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/T3JN-8J5D. 
252 Jack Gillium, Groups Urge Probe of $12 Million Mystery Donation, AP (Dec. 20, 2012, 7:49 
PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/groups-12-million-mystery-donation-was-crime, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MKR7-E6C2. 
253 Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Exclusive:  Largest Dark Money Donor Groups Share 
Funds, Hide Links, OPEN SECRETS (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
news/2013/09/exclusive-largest-dark-money-donor-groups-hide-ties-using-new-trick/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/956Z-CQTM; see also Mike McIntire & Nicholas Confessore, 
Tax-Exempt Groups Shield Political Gifts of Businesses, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/us/politics/groups-shield-political-gifts-of-
businesses.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/E2FH-4EZU. 
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anonymously to influence Montana elections.”254  Often little more than 
“shadow money mailboxes,” these legal persons have become a key 
mechanism for evading campaign finance laws.255  The ease with which 
politically-active artificial entities can be proliferated, reorganized, and 
dissolved makes the enforcement of constitutionally sound campaign 
finance laws far more difficult.  If these entities could make direct 
contributions to candidates as well as engage in independent spending, 
those difficulties would be further exacerbated.  Corporations have 
quickly come to play a large and growing role in enabling donors to 
avoid disclosure. 
As Ann Ravel, then-chair of California’s Fair Political Practices 
Commission (“FPPC”) and now a member of the Federal Election 
Commission, has observed, “people are willing to use circuitous routes 
to avoid telling the voters who is behind campaigns.”256  Ravel made her 
statement while announcing the imposition of a record $1 million civil 
fine as part of the settlement of a case brought by the FPPC and the 
California Attorney General against two nonprofit corporations that 
together funneled more than $15 million into a campaign against two 
ballot propositions—dealing with taxes and union political rights—on 
the 2012 California ballot.257  The money, which ultimately derived from 
a handful of super wealthy individuals, was channeled from the 
originating donors to a group called Americans for Job Security, which 
then transferred the money to the Center to Protect Patients’ Rights—the 
ballot propositions had nothing to do with patients’ rights—and then on 
to the Arizona-based Americans for Responsible Leadership and the 
Iowa-based American Future Fund before the funds were finally sent on 
to the Small Business Action Committee and the California Future Fund 
for Free Markets for spending to oppose the ballot measures.258  It was, 
as one news account put it, “a daisy chain of organizations” “that 
operatives took to skirt disclosure obligations.”259 
                                                 
254 W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011). 
255 Maguire & Novack, supra note 253. 
256 Matea Gold & Tom Hamburger, California Donor Disclosure Case Exposes How Nonprofit 
Groups Can Play in Politics, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/california-donor-disclosure-case-exposes-how-nonprofits-play-in-politics/2013/11 
/04/70e0b7ac-4246-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
GW73-2SJ2. 
257 Id. 
258 Nicholas Confessore, Group Linked to Kochs Admits to Campaign Finance Violations, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/us/politics/group-linked-
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Similarly, Western Tradition Partnership touted to prospective 
donors: 
[W]e’re not required to report the name or the amount of 
any contribution that we receive.  So, if you decide to 
support this program, no politician, no bureaucrat, and 
no radical environmentalist will ever know you helped 
make this program possible.  . . .  You can just sit back on 
election night and see what a difference you have 
made.260 
It is not difficult to imagine corporations, if allowed to make campaign 
contributions, playing a similar role in enabling individuals to evade the 
limits on individual donations.  The role of corporations in channeling 
funds to SuperPACs engaged in independent spending could easily 
provide a model for individuals seeking to enhance their ability to make 
contributions to candidates beyond the statutory ceiling.  An individual 
who has “maxed out” on her permissible donation to a candidate could 
then also create a corporation, fund that entity, and use that entity to 
make another legally permissible maximum contribution.  A recent 
investigation of campaign practices in New York State, which permits 
contributions by both corporations and LLCs, found that it is standard 
practice for organizations to generate LLCs and subsidiaries to make 
campaign contributions.261  The New York study found that one entity 
had “utilized [twenty-five] separate LLCs and subsidiary entities to 
make 147 separate political contributions totaling more than $3.1 
million” over a four-year period.262 
Alternatively, nonprofit corporations that engage in a mix of 
electoral and other forms of political activity could be used as conduits 
for additional contributions to candidates.  To be sure, corporate 
contributions to candidates would likely be smaller than the hundreds of 
millions spent by SuperPACs if Congress responds to any invalidation of 
the corporate spending ban with the enactment of a monetary limit on 
corporate donations similar to those currently imposed on individual 
and PAC donations.263  But permitting corporate contributions would 
                                                 
260 W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d. 1, 7 (Mont. 2011). 
261 State of New York, The Commission to Investigate Public Corruption, Preliminary 
Report, at 37 (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/sites/ 
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still enable individuals to give more than the individual-to-candidate 
limits that the courts have found to be valid. 
The anti-circumvention argument has most purchase for single-
shareholder, closely-held, and nonprofit corporations—precisely those 
corporations for which the shareholder-protection argument is least 
persuasive.  These are the entities most likely to be dominated by a small 
number of individuals who can use them to advance their personal 
political concerns.  With these organizations, the problem is not the 
corporate “war chest” concern underlying Austin that Citizens United so 
powerfully repudiated, but the ease with which they can be deployed to 
circumvent the limits on individual donations to candidates.  The anti-
circumvention concern also explains why an absolute ban, rather than a 
dollar limit on corporate donations comparable to that on individual 
donations, is needed.  Assuming there are substantial, if not compelling, 
public interests in preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption that validate the statutory dollar limits on individual 
donations, then every dollar above the statutory limit that is channeled 
through a corporation triggers those interests. 
B. Narrow Tailoring After McCutcheon 
After McCutcheon, the main question for the corporate contribution 
ban is whether it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to preventing the use of 
the corporate form to circumvent the limits on individual donations, or 
whether there are alternative, less burdensome means of achieving that 
goal.  In McCutcheon, the Court focused on three sets of factors in 
determining whether a restriction is sufficiently narrowly tailored for it 
to be justified by the anti-circumvention interest:  (1) the existence of 
other legal rules addressing circumvention; (2) the practical likelihood of 
circumvention if the challenged restriction were eliminated; and (3) the 
burden of the restriction on First Amendment rights in light of the 
availability of other forms of campaign participation.264  In McCutcheon’s 
aggregate limit context, the Court concluded  there were multiple other 
campaign finance laws that either already prevented or could be adopted 
to prevent circumvention of contribution limits, such as limits on 
donations by individuals to political committees, limits on donors 
creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees, limits on 
donations to political committees that support or which the donor 
anticipates will support a candidate the donor has directly supported, 
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limits on committee-to-committee and candidate-to-committee transfers, 
and strengthened rules on earmarking, that is, the practice of giving to a 
political committee with an implicit understanding that the committee 
will use the donation to aid a specific candidate.265  But these rules would 
not preclude the use of the corporate form to evade individual-to-
candidate contribution limits. 
There are, of course, no federal laws that limit the number of 
corporations an individual can create, the amount of money an 
individual can invest in a for-profit corporation or donate to a nonprofit 
corporation, or control the ability of directors, executives, shareholders, 
or donors to a nonprofit to influence the election-related activities of a 
corporation.  Although a corporation could be subject to the restrictions 
applicable to political committees, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
statutory definition of federal “political committee” to apply only to 
organizations that have the “major purpose” of nominating or “election 
of a candidate.”266  As a result, any business corporation, both large 
public companies and closely-held companies like Hobby Lobby, or a 
nonprofit that engages primarily in spending that falls outside the 
definition of election-related activity, including political advertising that 
does not consist of express advocacy or the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy, would probably not be considered a “political 
committee” and not be subject to the constraints that were crucial to 
McCutcheon’s finding of alternative statutory or potential statutory 
limitations on circumvention. 
The earmarking restrictions would do little good in limiting the 
ability of donors—who are also dominant voices in the corporations on 
whose boards they sit, manage, or own shares—to direct corporate funds 
to candidates. Those who control a corporation need not make any 
“contribution” to the corporation as a predicate to directing the 
corporation to making a contribution to candidates to whom they have 
already given the maximum contribution.  Nor would they need to 
formally earmark any contribution they do make if they also control the 
decisions of the corporations that receive the funds.  As the Court 
previously observed in Colorado Republican, relying on the anti-
earmarking rule “ignores the practical difficulty of identifying and 
directly combating circumvention under actual political conditions.”267  
                                                 
265 Id. at 1446–47, 1458–59. 
266 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A) (2014) (defining a “political committee” as a “committee, 
club, association or other group of persons” that receives campaign contributions or makes 
campaign expenditures above the statutory $1000 threshold).  The Act then defines 
“person” to “include[] an individual, partnership, committee, association, [or] 
corporation.”  Id. § 30101(11); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). 
267 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 462 (2001). 
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Similarly, although rules could be framed that attempt to subject all 
related entities to a single contribution ceiling, such rules would likely be 
extremely difficult to administer.  Corporations can be structured to 
avoid formal affiliations or to have complex ownership relationships, so 
determining whether and how two or more firms are connected can be a 
difficult task for enforcement agencies. 
In McCutcheon, the Court focused on the practical unlikelihood that 
donors who have maxed out on their donations to the candidates they 
support would take advantage of the elimination of aggregate 
contribution limits by channeling additional contributions to those 
candidates through contributions to political party committees or the 
committees of other candidates.  According to the Court, “all indications 
are that many types of recipients have scant interest in re-gifting 
donations they receive.”268  More specifically, “state parties rarely 
contribute to candidates in other States,” and “candidates contribute 
only a small fraction of their campaign funds to other candidates.”269  As 
the Court explained, both political parties and candidates have their own 
distinct electoral interests, which may not include donating to specific 
candidates favored by certain donors.  But the political interests of the 
many small corporations controlled by their principal shareholders or 
nonprofits controlled by their executives or boards are likely to be 
exactly the same as those of their shareholders, executives, and boards.  
These firms may be entities legally distinct from their shareholders, 
managers, and directors, but when it comes to politics, like the religious 
beliefs at issue in Hobby Lobby, their electoral goals may be precisely the 
same as those of their shareholders and others that control them.  In 
other words, they are less intermediaries like political parties and more 
alter egos for their shareholders and controlling individuals who in 
practice will be quite capable of using the corporate form for 
circumvention of the individual donation limits. 
As for the magnitude of the burden on First Amendment rights in 
light of the availability of other forms of campaign participation, 
McCutcheon emphasized that the aggregate donation limit prevented 
donors from giving the non-corrupting base limit amount to as many 
candidates as they wanted, and that other means of providing support, 
such as personally volunteering for those candidates, were not “a 
realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of 
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candidates or causes.”270  The corporate contribution ban is a much less 
burdensome restriction on the rights of the individuals affiliated with a 
corporation. 
After McCutcheon, those individuals have the right to contribute the 
base amount to as many candidates as they desire.  The corporate 
contribution ban simply limits their ability to give more than the base 
amount to a candidate.  The ban does restrict the ability of individuals 
associated with a corporation to give as a group by having the 
contribution given by the corporation, but other means of providing 
support from the corporation are available. 
Given Citizens United, the corporation can engage in unlimited 
independent spending.  Although not a perfect substitute for a donation, 
McCutcheon noted that “from the donor’s point of view” this is still a 
valuable alternative.271  Such independent spending also provides 
information to voters and the public about the corporation’s views about 
the election.  And, of course, the law provides an alternative mechanism 
for individuals associated with the corporation to support candidates in 
the name of the corporation—the PAC. 
The corporation can establish a PAC, select its managers, spend 
corporate funds soliciting donations from individuals affiliated with the 
corporation, and exercise total authority over which candidates the PAC 
will support and how much, up to the statutory ceiling, those candidates 
will receive.  Although Citizens United rejected the idea that a 
corporation’s ability to create a PAC and direct the spending of PAC 
funds solved the First Amendment problem posed by the banning of 
corporate independent spending, the PAC is a more adequate alternative 
in the contribution context.272 
The Court has repeatedly held that there can be no limit to 
independent spending. Limiting a corporation’s spending to its PAC 
funds, when the size of individual donations to the PAC are subject to a 
statutory ceiling, means the corporation will have less money to spend 
on elections than if it could also draw on its treasury funds.273  But 
assuming that corporate donations to individual candidates would be 
subject to a dollar cap, the requirement that the PAC draw its funds from 
voluntary donations from persons affiliated with the corporation is 
much less of a restriction on the ability of a corporation to contribute to a 
candidate.  Moreover, as previously noted, the PAC device also protects 
                                                 
270 Id. at 1449. 
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dissenting shareholders from having their share of corporate resources 
given to candidates they do not support.274 
The combination of unlimited corporate independent spending and 
the availability of the corporate PAC device for contributions mitigates 
the burden on freedom of association posed by the corporate 
contribution ban.  Individuals associated with a corporation can still 
participate in campaign financing under the name of the corporation 
through its PAC, and the corporation as a distinct entity can still support 
candidates through the independent spending of treasury funds.  The 
relatively modest burden on associational rights resulting from the 
corporate treasury fund contribution bans is surely not more than the 
“‘significant interference’ with protected right of political association” 
that the Court has repeatedly indicated it is willing to allow to prevent 
evasion of the important public interests in preventing corruption and its 
appearance that support limits on individual contributions to 
candidates.275 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The corporate contribution ban is closely drawn to accomplish two 
substantial public interests:  (1) the protection of dissenting shareholders; 
and (2) the prevention of the circumvention of the limits on individual 
contributions to candidates, which vindicate the public’s interests in 
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.276  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held these are important public interests; 
indeed, McCutcheon indicates that the anti-corruption interest is 
“compelling.”277  The two interests work in tandem, with the 
shareholder-protection interest most salient for publicly held for-profit 
corporations, and anti-circumvention more applicable for closely-held 
and for nonprofit corporations.  Both interests together support a 
complete ban, rather than a dollar limit, on corporate contributions as 
any corporate donations raise the prospect of the political use of money 
inconsistent with shareholder preferences or the evasion of the statutory 
caps on individual donations to candidates.  And, as McCutcheon 
                                                 
274 Citizens United also expressed concern about the recordkeeping and reporting 
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requires, the ban is proportionate to these interests.278  There are no 
effective alternative mechanisms for vindicating these interests than the 
ban.  Given management’s complete control over the decision whether to 
make campaign contributions, the “procedures of corporate democracy” 
are inadequate to protect dissenting shareholder interests.279  So, too, 
given the ease with which individuals have already used the corporate 
form to evade the disclosure of donors to entities that engage in 
independent spending, it is evident that the corporate form could easily 
be used to circumvent the individual contribution limits.  And the 
corporate contribution ban still permits many forms of corporate 
participation in elections, including unlimited independent spending, 
and contributions by PACs created, financed, and controlled by their 
parent corporations. 
Of course, this analysis depends on the Court’s continuing 
adherence to the contribution/expenditure distinction with its less 
stringent review of contribution restrictions.  Buckley held that 
contributions are a less protected form of campaign finance activity than 
expenditures because a contribution: 
[S]erves as a general expression of support for the 
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the 
underlying basis for the support.  . . .  While 
contributions may result in political expression if spent 
by a candidate or an association to present views to the 
voters, the transformation of contributions into political 
debate involves speech by someone other than a 
contributor.280 
As a result, the Court has not applied strict scrutiny to contribution 
restrictions; but has found that contribution controls can be justified by 
interests that are “weighty” even if not “compelling;” and have required 
restrictions to be “closely drawn” but “not necessarily the least 
restrictive means” to achieve the public interest the restriction is 
intended to vindicate.281  However, the Court has recently hinted that the 
more relaxed standard of review of contribution restrictions may be up 
for reconsideration. 
In McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the parties and amici 
had spent “significant energy” on the question “whether the line Buckley 
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drew between contributions and expenditures should remain law.”282  
The Court declined to reach the question or “parse the difference 
between the two standards” because it found that there was so 
“substantial” a “mismatch” between the aggregate limit at issue in that 
case and the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention goals said to justify 
it that the limit flunked even Buckley’s less restrictive “closely drawn” 
test.283  In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas called for applying 
strict scrutiny to contribution restrictions, a position he has frequently 
taken before, occasionally joined by Justice Scalia.284  Justice Kennedy has 
also indicated some restiveness with the contribution/expenditure 
distinction.285  A few months after McCutcheon was handed down, in 
McCullen v. Coakley, the Court confirmed that McCutcheon had 
“assume[d], without deciding” whether Buckley’s “less stringent level of 
scrutiny applies,” implying that the Court is not necessarily still 
committed to Buckley’s approach.286  Moreover, McCutcheon plainly 
ratcheted up the “closely drawn” test as it invalidated a contribution 
restriction Buckley had previously upheld, the first time the Court has 
overruled any part of Buckley.287  I have indicated that the corporate 
contribution ban can survive even McCutcheon’s tighter approach to 
narrow tailoring.  But if McCutcheon is signaling the Court’s 
abandonment of Buckley’s “relatively complaisant review” of 
contributions then the contribution ban will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to sustain.288 
Citizens United rejected the shareholder-protection justification for an 
expenditure ban.289  If contribution restrictions are to receive the same 
treatment as expenditure regulations, then it would be unlikely 
shareholder protection could validate a contribution ban.  And if 
contribution restrictions start to fall because they are insufficiently 
narrowly tailored to advance the anti-corruption interest, as Justice 
Thomas has contended, then the anti-circumvention justification would 
disappear because there would be no individual contribution restrictions 
to circumvent.290  In the end, then, the fate of the corporate contribution 
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ban is likely to turn on the constitutional status of contribution limits 
generally rather than a particular jurisprudence of corporate campaign 
finance activity. 
There is, of course, a reasonable question as to whether the corporate 
contribution ban, or any contribution restrictions for that matter, makes 
much sense given Citizens United and McCutcheon.  In light of the ability 
of corporations, individuals, and a host of other campaign actors to 
spend as much as they want on communications aimed at the voters, and 
of wealthy individuals to give to an unlimited number of candidates, 
political party committees, and other political committees that support or 
oppose candidates, it is unclear exactly what contribution limits do to 
stem the influence of big spenders and donors on elections and on the 
governmental decisions of elected officials.  Even under the Court’s 
relatively narrow focus on the corruption of individual officeholders 
rather than on the impact of campaign money on the political system 
more broadly, it is undeniable that big independent spenders and mega-
donors are able to use their campaign money to obtain greater political 
influence, even without the quid pro quos that the Court has made the 
focus of the corruption concern.  So, why even bother attempting to 
defend the corporate contribution restriction? 
There are two answers to that.  First, there may be some merit to the 
Court’s position that money given directly to a candidate is likely to be 
more valuable to the candidate and, as a result, a source of greater 
influence for the donor than an equivalent amount of money spent 
independently in support of that candidate.  Unlike independent 
spending, the candidate has complete control over the use of the 
donation, including whether it should be used for ads, and if so, the 
content of and audience for the ads.  Independent spending can 
sometimes strike the wrong notes or distract from the candidate’s 
messages.  Although there are modes of informal cooperation between 
spender and candidate that can allay this problem, it is surely the case 
that a candidate would prefer to have total control over his or her 
campaign’s money. 
Moreover, even when the candidate’s and the independent 
committee’s messages are in complete accord, candidate broadcast 
advertising  benefits from the requirement that candidates can be 
charged only the lowest unit rate while independent committees may 
have to pay more for the same volume of advertising in the same 
markets.  As a result, a dollar of candidate broadcast ad spending can go 
further than the independent spending dollar.  To be sure, the ability of 
independent groups to engage in unlimited spending can offset some of 
the disadvantages of unlimited spending relative to contributions to a 
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candidate, but dollar-for-dollar a candidate is likely to prefer, and feel 
more gratitude for, a contribution than an expenditure, so there may still 
be some anti-corruption benefit in limiting contributions even when 
there are no limits on spending. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this Article is concerned 
with the constitutionality of corporate contribution limits, not their 
wisdom.  The question of whether the federal government, a state, or a 
locality decides to bar corporate contributions should be up to the 
elected representatives of the jurisdiction (or the voters in a jurisdiction 
with the voter initiative), not the courts.  Campaign finance regulation 
involves highly contested issues of both political philosophy and the 
empirical assessment of the impact of money on elections and 
governance.  The Constitution provides no clear answers to these 
questions and it is far from obvious that unelected federal judges with 
little experience in electoral politics are better at resolving these 
questions than democratically accountable representatives or the voters 
themselves.  Nonetheless, for close to forty years the Supreme Court has 
assumed a leading role in setting campaign finance policy and restricting 
the regulatory options available to the public.  In so doing, the Court has 
followed a complex and inconsistent path, relying on difficult 
distinctions, and changing its position on such basic questions as the 
justifications for regulation and the deference due to elected decision-
makers or the voters.  In the past decade the Court has greatly tightened 
its control, with a narrow majority striking down multiple federal and 
state laws in decisions such as Citizens United and McCutcheon that have 
entailed overturning the Court’s own precedents. 
Given the lack of a clear constitutional mandate for the Court’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence, the difficulty the Court has experienced 
in developing workable doctrines or sticking with the rules it has 
articulated, and the general absence of obvious right answers for 
campaign finance law it would be desirable to leave some discretion to 
democratically accountable decision-makers.  There is certainly a 
“laboratories of democracy” justification for such an approach—with 
some states barring corporate contributions and some allowing them, we 
can get a better understanding of their impact on elections, governance, 
and the interests of corporations, than if the bar is pronounced 
unconstitutional.  And then there is the plain-old democracy justification 
for not striking down laws that have enjoyed public support for more 
than a century, have had no apparent deleterious impact on the political 
process, have not discriminated against any individuals or ideas, and 
have long been accepted as consistent with prevailing constitutional 
doctrine.  Barring corporate contributions may or may not make sense in 
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light of the constitutional protection for unlimited spending, but that 
judgment should be entrusted to the democratic process, not the courts. 
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